

# JEWISH ENROLLMENT AT HARVARD AND ITS PEERS

1967-2025

A  
*Narrowing*  
*Gate*



Harvard  
Jewish  
Alumni  
Alliance

HARVARD JEWISH ALUMNI ALLIANCE

**A Narrowing Gate: Jewish Enrollment at  
Harvard and Its Peers, 1967–2025**

*APPENDICES*

March 2026

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# How to Use These Appendices

These technical appendices are a companion document to “A Narrowing Gate.” They are designed to stand alone: every key figure, methodology, and falsification test cited in the body report has its primary data here. The table below directs readers to the most common entry points. Appendices A through F build on each other; readers with a specific question can enter at any point and follow cross-references as needed.

## How to Use These Appendices

IF YOU WANT TO...	GO TO
Understand how data sources were selected and evaluated	<b>Appendix A.1–A.5</b>
See the Hillel data audit and calibration methodology	<b>A.2, A.6; Tables A.6.1–A.6.2</b>
Check confidence levels for specific claims (Level A / B / C)	<b>Appendix A.8 (Tables A.8.1–A.8.3)</b>
Review the complete Harvard Crimson freshman survey data	<b>Appendix B.1–B.14</b>
Verify the Crimson survey is not skewed by selection bias	<b>Appendix B.15–B.16</b>
See Jewish enrollment figures and trends across all nine schools	<b>Appendix C.1–C.2</b>
See the White Decomposition (Jewish vs. non-Jewish White declines)	<b>Appendix C.3; sensitivity in E.1–E.2</b>
See why seven alternative explanations were ruled out	<b>Appendix D.1–D.11</b>
Understand why Princeton is the benchmark and what it proves	<b>Appendix E.3; Tables E.3.1–E.3.3</b>
See how each school is classified (anomalous / proportional / outperformer)	<b>Appendix E.4–E.5; Table E.4</b>
Understand the stacking model and why it does not explain the anomaly	<b>Appendix F.1–F.5</b>
Find the complete bibliography and source notes	<b>Appendix G</b>

## ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THESE APPENDICES

<b>CDS</b>	<b>COMMON DATA SET</b>	<b>J/WNJ</b>	<b>JEWISH-TO-WHITE NON-JEWISH ENROLLMENT RATIO</b>
<b>CIRP</b>	Cooperative Institutional Research Program (UCLA)	<b>OECD/JRC</b>	OECD/Joint Research Centre composite index methodology
<b>CMJS</b>	Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies (Brandeis)	<b>PAW</b>	Princeton Alumni Weekly
<b>DP</b>	Daily Princetonian	<b>Pp</b>	Percentage points
<b>IPEDS</b>	Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (U.S. Dept. of Education)	<b>SSRI</b>	Steinhardt Social Research Institute (Brandeis)

Note: The J/WNJ ratio measures how fast Jewish enrollment changed relative to White non-Jewish enrollment at the same school. A ratio of 1.0× means Jews and non-Jews declined at identical rates (proportional). Above 1.0× means Jewish enrollment declined disproportionately faster. Princeton's 0.11× means Jewish enrollment declined at 11% of the rate of White non-Jews (outperformer). Harvard's 2.33× means Jewish enrollment declined 2.33 times faster (anomalous).

# Data, Methods, and Source Evaluation

This appendix is the methodological foundation for the entire report. Sections A.1–A.5 establish which data sources are used and why; A.6 documents the Hillel audit corrections applied; A.7 addresses the secularization objection directly; and A.8 assigns a formal confidence tier to every substantive claim in the report.

A.9 provides the full source catalog for Penn, Yale, Princeton, and Brown. Readers who accept the data sources at face value can proceed directly to Appendix B; readers who want to stress-test the methodology should read A.1–A.8 in full.

## A.1 PRIMARY DATA STREAMS

This report draws on six independent data sources: (1) Hillel International College Guide estimates, reconstructed via Internet Archive Wayback Machine; (2) Brandeis University CMJS/SSRI random-sample survey (2016 Harvard study: preferred baseline); (3) Harvard Crimson annual freshman surveys, Classes of 2017–2027 (excluding 2026); (4) Common Data Set Section B2 institutional enrollment filings; (5) IPEDS enrollment and Student Financial Aid survey data; and (6) independent newspaper surveys, Brown Daily Herald, Yale Daily News, Daily Princetonian. No single source is authoritative alone. Findings rest on convergence across independent instruments.

## A.2 HILLEL DATA: USES, LIMITATIONS, AND SOURCE TIER CLASSIFICATION

**Hillel as cross-school baseline.** Hillel International’s College Guide provides Jewish enrollment estimates for all nine schools in this study, verified through Internet Archive Wayback Machine captures spanning 2013–2025. These estimates are the only cross-school comparable dataset available and establish the directional foundation for Jewish enrollment trend analysis throughout this report.

**Structural limitation.** Hillel figures carry a structural limitation that precludes their use as precise quantitative point estimates. Wayback Machine captures show that large single-year changes in Hillel’s reported figures reflect revisions to Hillel’s internal counting methodology, not genuine enrollment shifts. Harvard’s reported enrollment dropped from 25% to 12% over five months (October 2015 to March 2016); Yale’s from 27% to 15% in a single step (June 2017 to June 2018). Because Hillel does not publicly document its counting methodology, pre- and post-revision figures are not directly comparable, and specific magnitude estimates carry material uncertainty.

**Harvard's revision explained.** Hillel International's College Guide figures are self-reported by local chapter directors, not independently administered surveys. According to Hillel's own VP of Communications, the data is based largely on students who provide their contact information to Hillel or engage at least once with programming, supplemented by community contacts and, where available, Birthright eligibility lists and institutional surveys. No standardized methodology is publicly documented.

In 2016, a Brandeis CMJS stratified random sample of Harvard undergraduates found 14 percent inclusive enrollment against Hillel's then-reported 25 percent. Harvard Hillel revised its figure downward following the Brandeis study, which produced the first rigorous random-sample measurement of Jewish enrollment at Harvard and found the prior figure was inflated 1.8-fold. The current 7.1 percent carries external academic validation the pre-revision number never had.

**Upper-bound scenario (note: this figure was subsequently revised down — treat as historical reference only).** The 25 percent figure is retained in this report not as a reliable estimate but as a documented historical data point establishing the upper boundary of what any reasonable reading of the data could support; under this upper-bound scenario, Harvard's Jewish enrollment would have fallen from roughly one in four students to roughly one in fourteen — a 72 percent drop. Under a critics' preferred upper bound of approximately 9 percent — derived by applying the calibration multiplier ( $\sim 5.8\% \times 1.57 \approx 9.1\%$ ) to the current Crimson figure — the J/WNJ ratio is approximately 1.4 $\times$ . Harvard remains anomalous against the Princeton benchmark of 0.11 $\times$  under any reasonable adjustment to the current endpoint.

**Three-tier source hierarchy.** This report applies a three-tier source hierarchy to Jewish enrollment data. Tier 1 — Precise and auditable: The Harvard Crimson Freshman Survey, a ten-year consistent-instrument series (Classes 2017–2027). Tier 2 — Corroborated directional: Hillel trend confirmed in direction by an independent source: Brown (BDH intercept poll, Fall 2024), Yale (Chaplain's Office multi-year series), Harvard (Brandeis CMJS 2016 cross-section), and Cornell (2004 institutional survey). Tier 3 — Hillel only: Penn, Dartmouth, Stanford, and Columbia. Direction is indicated; specific figures should not be cited as point estimates. All nine schools use Hillel's earliest available 2013–14 Wayback Machine capture as the baseline for cross-school comparability.

**Pre-digital anchor: 1999 print edition.** Hillel's Guide to Jewish Life on Campus, 14th Edition (1999), provides campus personnel estimates for all nine schools in this study. The guide's methodology page (p. 22) describes the figures as “best guess” estimates “suggested by personnel on each campus,” representing “the relative proportion of Jewish students to the general enrollment,” and notes that some colleges “still circulate religious preference cards” as an input — suggesting the 1999 vintage may be more data-grounded than later estimates produced after card use declined. Hillel's 14th Edition is not used as a primary baseline in this report. It is classified as a directional anchor: it extends the documented record into the pre-digital era and is consistent in direction with the Wayback Machine series and independent instruments. For Harvard, the 1999 print figure is 21.1 percent undergraduate; for Princeton, 12.0 percent undergraduate, consistent with the contemporaneous Hargadon CIRP series (9–13 percent, 1988–2003 average 10.5 percent). Source: Hillel: The Foundation for Jewish Campus Life, Guide to Jewish Life on Campus, 14th ed. Washington, DC: Hillel, 1999. p. 22. Physical copy held by the HJAA research collection.

### A.3 HARVARD MEASUREMENT HIERARCHY AND CALIBRATION MULTIPLIER

**Primary instrument: the Crimson series.** For Harvard (the focal school of this study), the primary Jewish enrollment data source is the Harvard Crimson Freshman Survey, which records religious self-identification among entering freshmen. The ten-year series shows: early cluster average (Classes 2017–2019)  $\approx 10\%$ , late cluster average (Classes 2023, 2024, 2025, and 2027; no 2026 survey published)  $\approx 5.8\%$ , a relative decline of approximately 40% on a consistent instrument. This is the preferred figure for Harvard-specific decline claims.

**Brandeis cross-section as corroboration.** The Brandeis CMJS/SSRI 2016 study (stratified random sample, inclusive estimate  $\approx 14\%$ ) provides cross-sectional corroboration contemporaneous with the Crimson early cluster. No equivalent end-point study exists, so Brandeis cannot anchor a trend calculation; it confirms that the Crimson religious-ID figures calibrate to a plausible inclusive enrollment estimate. The calibration multiplier ( $1.43\times$ – $1.57\times$ ) converts Crimson religious-ID figures to inclusive estimates, derived by comparing the 2016 Brandeis inclusive figure ( $\sim 14\%$ ) to the contemporaneous Crimson religious-ID average ( $\sim 9$ – $10\%$ ). In relative-change calculations the multiplier cancels entirely; no assumption about secular Jews is needed to reach the decline findings.

**Hillel as upper-bound reference.** The Hillel figure (25% baseline, Sep 2013 Wayback

capture; current 7.1%) is retained as the upper-bound reference scenario, producing an approximately 72% relative decline. It is reported throughout but is not the primary estimate because: (1) the 25% figure predates a major Hillel methodology revision and is not comparable to current Hillel reporting; and (2) the Crimson series provides a more precise and consistent instrument for Harvard specifically.

**Direction of bias.** A response-bias critic must specify not merely that bias exists, but which direction it runs and whether that direction is consistent across time. If Jewish students over-responded to the Crimson survey throughout the measurement window, the corrected Harvard enrollment figure would be lower than the reported range of 5.4 to 5.8 percent – making the decline larger, the anomaly more severe, and the finding more damning, not less. A bias that uniformly inflates the Jewish enrollment figure throughout the series leaves the directional conclusion intact and strengthens the quantitative case.

**For bias to exonerate, it must run in opposite directions.** For response bias to exonerate Harvard, it would have to run in opposite directions at opposite ends of the series: inflating Jewish figures in the early years and deflating them after 2020. The Crimson's four-year validation record provides no support for any directional shift of that kind. A critic who invokes selection bias must therefore specify the mechanism by which opt-in propensity shifted directionally by religion while remaining stable on every verifiable demographic dimension.

**Instrument convergence.** The Harvard finding does not rest on the Crimson alone. Hillel International, which operates a direct organizational count rather than a survey, places Harvard at 7.1 percent inclusive — the lowest of any documented Ivy League institution. The Brandeis CMJS/SSRI nationally calibrated research instrument independently converges on the same directional conclusion.

These three instruments use fundamentally different methodologies: one is an organizational count, one is a voluntary self-administered survey, and one is a calibrated research program. Selection bias is a meaningful critique of one specific instrument type; it cannot simultaneously explain away three independent methodologies using different data-collection architectures that all point to the same conclusion. The convergence of Hillel, Crimson, and Brandeis across method is the core of the evidentiary case, and it is the convergence that a selection-bias critique must address — not the Crimson in isolation.

**Response bias validation scope:** The Crimson’s Senior Survey methodology notes certify, across four consecutive graduating classes (2022–2025), that respondents were representative of the broader student body on gender, race, and ethnicity — the three dimensions Harvard independently publishes. This certification does not extend to religious self-identification, because Harvard does not publish religious composition data and therefore provides no external benchmark for religion-specific validation. The religion-specific validation accordingly remains

inferential: if opt-in response propensity is unbiased on every verifiable dimension, there is no identified mechanism by which it would be selectively biased for religion alone. This inference is explicitly characterized as an inference, not a direct test, in the report body and in Appendix B.15.

Independent estimates by scholars of American higher education have placed Harvard’s mid-2010s inclusive Jewish enrollment at approximately 20 percent or above for some entering classes. These estimates are not derived from documented stratified sampling and are therefore not used as baselines in this analysis. Their existence confirms that the Brandeis 14 percent figure, derived from a documented stratified random sample, represents a conservative lower bound rather than an upper bound on the true figure.

## A.4 THREE MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS COMPARED

**Table A.4. Harvard Measurement Systems: Strengths and Limitations**

SYSTEM	ESTIMATE	METHODOLOGY	STRENGTH	KEY LIMITATION
Brandeis CMJS / SSRI 2016 (preferred)	~14%	Stratified random sample	Gold standard – random sample, inclusive definition	Single cross-section; one campus, one year
Harvard Crimson Freshman Survey (religious ID)	~9–10% early cluster avg.; ~5.8% recent cluster avg.	Voluntary self-ID, entering class only	Consistent instrument across 10 cohorts; Harvard-specific	Religious ID only; excludes secular / cultural Jews (~20–30% of total)
Hillel International (stale peak)	~25% (pre-2016); ~7.1% (2025)	Engagement-based campus staff estimates	Inclusive definition; available across all peer schools	Stale; methodology opaque; ~79% overstatement documented at Harvard vs. Brandeis

## A.5 SCHOOL-BY-SCHOOL SOURCE QUALITY

**Four-Tier Confidence Framework.** HIGH: two or more independent, methodologically distinct instruments converging on same direction and similar magnitude (Harvard, Yale). MEDIUM-HIGH: one rigorous instrument (random sample or consistent multi-year series) plus Hillel cross-check; preferred endpoint is not Hillel (Princeton). MEDIUM: Hillel baseline plus one independent corroboration (survey, institutional report, or newspaper intercept poll); direction confirmed, magnitude approximate (Penn, Brown). MEDIUM-LOW: Hillel only, no independent corroboration; direction indicated, specific figures are estimates and should not be cited as

point estimates (Cornell, Stanford, Dartmouth).

Source reliability varies substantially across the nine schools. The summary below characterizes each school’s evidence base:

**The following entries characterize the evidence base for each school, in the order they appear throughout the report: Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Penn, Columbia, Dartmouth, Brown, Cornell, and Stanford.**

### HARVARD

**HIGH CONFIDENCE. Harvard:** Three-source confirmed (Brandeis CMJS, Crimson, Hillel). All three converge on substantial decline. Preferred baseline: Brandeis CMJS ~14% (2016).

## YALE

**HIGH CONFIDENCE. Yale:** Three-source confirmed (Yale Chaplain's Office surveys, Yale Daily News, Hillel). Chaplain and YDN agree to within 0.985 $\times$  with no shared methodology. Hillel pre-2018 figure (~27%) overstates starting point ~35%.

Yale University Chaplain's Office Series. The Yale Chaplain's Office has administered a religious affiliation survey to incoming freshmen since the 1930s, making it the only instrument in this dataset with a consistent long-run record that predates the modern admissions era entirely. The early decades used mandatory survey collection; the modern instrument is voluntary, with an acknowledged response rate of approximately 40–50 percent (per the Chaplain's own Religious Diversity at Yale methodology page). This voluntary structure raises a potential selection bias concern: students with stronger religious identity may be more likely to complete a religious affiliation survey, meaning the Chaplain's figures may over-represent religiously engaged Jewish students relative to total Jewish enrollment.

This concern is substantially rebutted by three-instrument convergence. The Chaplain's series, the Yale Daily News freshman survey (a general survey not targeted at religious students), and Hillel International converge to within 0.985 $\times$  of one another despite having no shared methodology. If the Chaplain instrument were systematically over-counting religiously affiliated students, divergence from the YDN and Hillel figures would be expected; convergence at 0.985 $\times$  is strong indirect validation that all three instruments are measuring the same underlying population.

Additionally, the direction of selection bias, if present, would understate rather than overstate the enrollment decline. A voluntary survey with 40–50 percent response rate likely

captures the most religiously engaged Jewish students as a floor on total Jewish presence. A decline in Chaplain figures therefore represents a conservative estimate: the true decline in total Jewish enrollment is at least as large as the Chaplain's series records, and possibly larger.

Response bias note: Neither the Yale Daily News freshman survey nor any other YDN survey instrument publishes a bias certification against Yale institutional data. The YDN Class of 2022 survey explicitly stated 'Survey results were not adjusted for selection bias.' More recent YDN surveys omit methodology statements entirely. The response bias objection for YDN-sourced figures is an open, unaddressed limitation.

## BROWN

**MEDIUM CONFIDENCE. Brown:** Two sources (BDH intercept poll; Hillel). BDH found 14% on religious self-ID (Fall 2024); applying the calibration multiplier yields ~20–22% inclusive. Note: the calibration multiplier (1.43–1.57 $\times$ ) was derived from Harvard-specific data (Brandeis CMJS 2016 vs. contemporaneous Crimson); its application to Brown is approximate and may not perfectly reflect Brown's secular Jewish population. Direction confirmed: Brown's Jewish enrollment is substantially above Harvard's on any methodology.

Response bias note: The Brown Daily Herald intercept poll series and First-Year Poll contain no methodology sections and no cross-validation against Brown institutional data. No bias certification equivalent to the Harvard Crimson's four-year record exists for either BDH instrument. The response bias objection for BDH-sourced figures is an open, unaddressed limitation.

**Table A.5.1. Brown Daily Herald Poll Series: Religion Data Inventory**

WAVE	JEWISH %	N	RR / N	NOTES
Campus-wide – Fall 2024 ★ PREFERRED	14%	1,177	Sept 24–26	Check all that apply. ★ PREFERRED CORROBORATION.
Campus-wide – Spring 2025	11.5%	1,145	Apr 2025	Check all that apply. Consistent format with Fall 2024.
Campus-wide – Fall 2025 ⚠	9.0%	1,374	Oct 2025	Single-select. ⚠ NOT COMPARABLE. Exclude from trend analysis.
First-Year Poll 2024 (Class of 2028)	10.2%	738	Aug 2024	Single-select. SEPARATE INSTRUMENT.
First-Year Poll 2025 (Class of 2029)	8%	710	Aug 2025	Single-select. SEPARATE INSTRUMENT.
Pre-2024 polls	–	–	–	No religion question. BDH religion tracking is post-Oct 7. No baseline prior to Fall 2024.

Methodological notes: (1) The 2.5-point drop between Fall 2024 (14%) and Spring 2025 (11.5%) is statistically significant at ~2.5 standard errors. Its cause is unknown; it should not be characterized as noise. (2) Harvard comparison: Use Hillel-to-Hillel or religious-only-to-religious-only comparisons. Do not compare BDH religion-only figures against Harvard Hillel inclusive figures. (3) Brown remains MEDIUM confidence per the four-tier framework. RR = response rate.

## PRINCETON

### MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE. Princeton:

Three-source confirmed (CIRP via Hargadon (PAW, Feb 2006) historical ~10.5%; Daily Princetonian 3-yr average 9.87% (Senior 2022: 11.8%; Senior 2023: 8.3%; Senior 2024: 9.5%); Hillel 8.6% (cross-check)). Tightest range of any school, most precisely characterized after Harvard and Yale.

Daily Princetonian Senior Survey. The Daily Princetonian has conducted annual Senior Surveys since 2022, providing a consistent multi-wave endpoint series using a check-all-that-apply religion question. The Class of 2024 survey (the preferred current endpoint)

recorded 506 respondents and a 41.1 percent response rate. The Princetonian publishes no methodology section and no cross-validation against Princeton institutional data; it cannot self-certify for response bias the way the Harvard Crimson does.

Selection bias assessment. The Princetonian is a general senior survey administered to all graduating students regardless of religious identity; it does not target religiously affiliated populations. This is a fundamentally different selection structure from the Yale Chaplain’s survey. For the J/WNJ ratio, the relevant question is not whether the 41% response rate produces an accurate absolute figure, but whether response bias affects Jewish and non-

Jewish White respondents differently. There is no plausible mechanism for that differential effect on a general survey: both groups face identical response incentives.

Cross-instrument corroboration. Hillel International independently records Princeton Jewish enrollment declining approximately 34 percent over the same window, producing a proportional J/WNJ ratio consistent with the Princetonian series. Two independent instruments agree on the same conclusion.

Response bias note: The Daily Princetonian Senior Survey contains no methodology section and no cross-validation against Princeton institutional data. No bias certification equivalent to the Harvard Crimson's four-year record exists for this instrument. The response bias objection for DP-sourced figures is an open, unaddressed limitation.

## PENN

**MEDIUM CONFIDENCE. Penn:** Brandeis CMJS anchors at 2010 (~20%) and 2016 (~16%) both confirm direction of decline to current ~11%. Sources disagree on magnitude, not direction.

## CORNELL

**MEDIUM-LOW CONFIDENCE. Cornell:** One partial historical cross-check (2004 institutional survey: ~15.6% vs. Hillel ~21%). Treat 20% as upper bound. Statutory college structure provides an independent enrollment pathway.

## COLUMBIA

**UNCLASSIFIABLE. Columbia:** included but unclassifiable. Columbia is included in all IPEDS quantitative analyses (enrollment, geographic, financial aid, international, and stacking

tables) using IPEDS EF all-undergraduate figures (CC+SEAS+General Studies combined). Columbia shows the largest Jewish enrollment decline in the nine-school dataset at -28.6%, but this figure is marked unclassifiable in the confidence tier because it cannot be fully separated from a denominator effect.

The General Studies complication. General Studies, which is 35% White and 29% international, was progressively integrated into Columbia's all-UG reporting. If GS grew as a share of total enrollment over the period, it would mechanically compress reported White and Jewish shares independent of any admissions policy change. The Hillel estimate (~16%) also carries low confidence because it is unclear whether Hillel counted CC+SEAS only or all-UG including GS, making the baseline itself uncertain. Columbia's -28.6% trend is therefore reported throughout but treated as an upper-bound estimate requiring independent verification at the school level.

## STANFORD

**MEDIUM-LOW CONFIDENCE. Stanford:** No reliable independent contemporary survey. 2022 Advisory Task Force recommended a comprehensive study; not acted upon as of February 2026.

## DARTMOUTH

**MEDIUM-LOW CONFIDENCE. Dartmouth:** Zero independent contemporary corroboration. No newspaper survey; no Brandeis study. Least-characterized school in the dataset.

**Table A.5.2. Hillel vs. Independent Survey: School-by-School Ratio**

SCHOOL	HILLEL ESTIMATE	BEST INDEPENDENT SOURCE	RATIO (HILLEL ÷ SURVEY)	CONFIDENCE
Princeton	8.6%	Daily Princetonian surveys: 8.3–9.5%	~1.0×	High – three-source convergence
Yale	12.0% (revised)	Yale Chaplain / YDN: ~10–12.0%	~1.0–1.2×	High – three independent sources
Harvard	7.1% (current)	Crimson relig.-ID × 1.43 calibration: ~8.3%	~0.85× (current)	Medium – Hillel now at lower end of range
Penn	~11%	Brandeis CMJS 2016 inclusive ~16% (historical)	~1.25× (hist.)	Medium – two Brandeis anchors confirm direction
Brown	~24%	BDH intercept poll (Fall 2024): 14%	~1.7×	Medium – methodology gap explains most divergence
Cornell	~20%	2004 institutional survey: ~15.6%	~1.3× (hist.)	Low-Medium – single historical cross-check
Stanford	N/A	No reliable independent survey	N/A	Low – Hillel only
Dartmouth	~9%	No independent survey	N/A	Low – zero corroboration

† Key finding: Schools where Hillel’s historical overcount was largest (Harvard, Brown) are schools where Hillel’s peak baseline figures may themselves be inflated. This reinforces the preference for the Brandeis-anchored central estimate over the Hillel upper-bound scenario.

## A.6 HILLEL DATA AUDIT: CORRECTIONS AND FLAGS APPLIED

The Hillel College Guide data used in this report was audited on March 6, 2026. Four corrections were applied to the raw data before use; two items were flagged for transparency. The correction log below is provided for full auditability. No directional findings are affected by any correction.

**Table A.6.1. Hillel Data Audit: Corrections Applied and Items Flagged**

#	SCHOOL / SHEET	ISSUE TYPE	FINDING	RESOLUTION
1	Stanford	Data Error	Sep 2016 Total N = 6,099 inconsistent with Stanford enrollment; filed Jewish % nominally unaffected but Total N corrected for internal consistency.	CORRECTED. Total N revised to 7,000. No change to filed Jewish %.
2	Princeton	Rounding Error	Jan 2024 entry filed as 10% (500 / 5,236 = 9.55%); overstated by 0.45 pp.	CORRECTED. % revised to 9.6%.
3	Yale	Rounding Error	Oct 2014 entry filed as 27% (1,500 / 5,430 = 27.6%); understated by 0.6 pp.	CORRECTED. % revised to 27.6%.
4	Brown (Summary)	Internal Mismatch	Summary sheet listed Peak Jewish N = 1,000 (2014-2018) inconsistent with underlying school tab showing 1,700.	CORRECTED. Peak Jewish N revised to 1,700; Peak Year revised to 2016-2018.
5 ⚠	Columbia	Invalid Timestamp	Dec 2025 Wayback timestamp contains hours=40 (impossible); source data issue in Hillel capture record.	FLAGGED. No correction applied. Wayback URL retained; timestamp noted unreliable. Columbia figures otherwise unaffected.
6 ⚠	Columbia (All rows)	Source Data Quality	Hillel Total N fluctuates implausibly across Columbia captures, suggesting inconsistent Hillel methodology for this school rather than actual enrollment changes.	FLAGGED. No correction applied; source data limitation. Columbia included in IPEDS quantitative analyses only. See A.5.

⚠ = Flagged; no data change applied. 4 corrections applied total. No directional finding is affected by any correction. Audit conducted March 6, 2026.

**Table A.6.2. Hillel Wayback Machine Transitions: Figure-Drop Events Detected**

SCHOOL	EVENT	FROM DATE	TO DATE	N BEFORE	N AFTER	% BEFORE	% AFTER	CHANGE	NOTES
Harvard	DROP 1	Oct 2015	Mar 2016	1675	803	25%	12%	-52%	Major methodology change
Harvard	DROP 2	Jun 2018	Jul 2018	803	780	12%	11%	-3%	Minor adjustment
Harvard	DROP 3	Sep 2018	Apr 2019	780	700	11%	10%	-10%	
Harvard	DROP 4	Apr 2020	Oct 2020	700	585	10%	9%	-16%	
Harvard	DROP 5	Oct 2021	Apr 2022	585	494	9%	7%	-16%	Current level
Yale	DROP 1	Jun 2017	Jun 2018	1500	800	27%	15%	-47%	Single major drop
Penn	DROP 1	Sep 2016	Oct 2017	2500	1750	26%	18%	-30%	Major revision
Penn	DROP 2	Oct 2024	Oct 2025	1600	1100	16%	11%	-31%	Second major drop
Columbia	DROP 1	Jul 2014	Sep 2015	3000	2400	30%	39%	-20%	Total UG also changed
Columbia	DROP 2	Sep 2015	Jun 2016	2400	1800	39%	20%	-25%	
Columbia	DROP 3	Jun 2016	Oct 2017	1800	1500	20%	24%	-17%	
Columbia	DROP 4	Jan 2024	Dec 2025	1500	1400	22.5%	15.7%	-7%	
Cornell	DROP 1	Jun 2018	Dec 2019	3000	2500	21%	17%	-17%	Single drop
Princeton	DROP 1	Sep 2015	Aug 2016	650	550	12%	10%	-15%	Gradual decline
Princeton	DROP 2	Aug 2016	Oct 2017	550	500	10%	9%	-9%	
Princeton	DROP 3	May 2018	Oct 2019	500	450	9%	8%	-10%	
Princeton	RECOVERY	Jun 2022	Jan 2024	450	500	8%	10%	+11%	Partial recovery – reversed by Mar 2026
Princeton	DROP 4	Jan 2024	Mar 2026	500	450	10%	8.6%	-10%	Recovery reversed per live Hillel Mar 2026
Dartmouth	DROP 1	Jun 2017	Dec 2019	450	420	10%	9%	-7%	
Dartmouth	DROP 2	Sep 2022	Dec 2023	420	400	9%	8.8%	-5%	
Stanford	DROP 1	Sep 2016	Dec 2017	700	550	10%	8%	-21%	Single drop
Stanford	INCREASE	Oct 2022	Oct 2023	550	600	8%	7.7%	+9%	Partial recovery
Brown	DROP 1	Sep 2013	Dec 2014	1200	1000	20%	15%	-17%	Initial drop
Brown	INCREASE 1	Jun 2018	Dec 2019	1000	1350	14%	19%	+35%	First increase
Brown	INCREASE 2	Apr 2022	Feb 2023	1350	1700	19%	23.9%	+26%	Second increase - anomalous

† Source: Wayback Machine archive of Hillel International College Guide pages, retrieved 2025–2026. “Before” and “After” figures are the last archived value at the From Date and first archived value at the To Date respectively. Percentage figures drawn directly from Hillel page text; N figures derived from percentage × reported undergraduate enrollment. Only transitions with detectable numeric change are included.

## A.7 THE SECULARIZATION OBJECTION, AND WHY IT BACKFIRES

A persistent objection to Crimson-based analysis: Jewish students are increasingly likely to identify ethnically or culturally rather than religiously, so any apparent decline may partly reflect declining religiosity rather than declining enrollment. The objection is real. The calibration multiplier (1.43–1.6×) is supported by the 2016 Brandeis survey that found ~14% inclusive vs. ~9–10% religious-only at the same moment.

**The empirical basis for the concern.** There is a specific empirical grounding for this concern. The Pew Research Center's 2020 survey of Jewish Americans found that 27 percent of U.S. Jews are 'Jews of no religion': they identify religiously as atheist, agnostic, or nothing in particular, but consider themselves Jewish ethnically, culturally, or by family background. Among Jews ages 18 to 29 (the college-age cohort most relevant to this analysis), this share rises to 40 percent, up from 22 percent in the 2013 Pew survey. If the share of Jewish students who self-identify religiously has declined within the measurement window, a religion-only instrument will show a larger apparent decline than the true inclusive figure.

A similar observation applies to Yale, and arguably may apply to other peer universities too.

The Harvard Crimson data provide a direct test. In the cliff year — Class of 2019 to Class of 2020 — Jewish enrollment fell 3.8 percentage points in a single cohort. Every other religious

group was flat or within normal variation: agnostic +1.8pp, atheist +0.7pp, Catholic +0.7pp, Protestant -0.1pp. (The residual 'Other' category is not included because it is an ambiguous residual bucket that is not a clean secular signal.) The 3.8pp Jewish drop cannot be explained by relabeling into any visible or invisible category. A year-by-year test is more powerful than any decade-level ceiling calculation precisely because it shows whether the observed pattern is actually consistent with gradual drift — and this one is not. The subsequent plateau confirms the cliff was structural: across six post-cliff cohorts, Jewish enrollment ranged from 5.2% to 7.7% — every cohort between 21% and 47% below the pre-cliff average of 9.8%, with no cohort returning to pre-cliff levels. Secular drift produces gradual slopes (Stolz et al., *Nature Communications*, 16:7202 (2025): 'Once people reach adulthood they usually don't change their level of religiosity, on average.');

it does not produce cliffs followed by sustained lower levels. The Protestant comparison completes the picture: Protestant self-identification fell 69.7% in relative terms over the same decade — steeper than the Jewish religious self-identification decline of 43.2% (Class of 2017 to Class of 2027) — with no campus climate explanation. That is what secular drift looks like: gradual and broad. The Jewish pattern is categorically different.

Secularization also cannot explain the Harvard-peer divergence: Brown's and Cornell's applicant pools experienced identical national secularization trends, and their Jewish enrollment did not collapse.

## A.8 CONFIDENCE LEVEL FRAMEWORK

This section organizes the report’s claims into three confidence tiers. Level A claims are established by convergent evidence from multiple independent sources and would be revised only by new institutional data. Level B claims are well-supported but require additional evidence. Level C claims are labeled ‘Inferences at Level C’ to reflect their speculative character; they warrant investigation but are not established findings. The body report contains a summary confidence framework in Act V; this section provides the full version with individual evidence citations for each claim.

### A.8.1 LEVEL A: ESTABLISHED BY CONVERGENT EVIDENCE

**Table A.8.1. Claims at Level A: Established by Convergent Evidence**

CLAIM	EVIDENCE
Jewish enrollment at Harvard has declined substantially since the early 2010s.	Convergent Hillel, Brandeis CMJS, and Crimson data all show decline in the same direction.
The decline is large: approximately 40% on the Crimson instrument (preferred; ~10% early cluster → ~5.8% late cluster), or up to ~72% under the Hillel upper-bound scenario.	Crimson 10-year series (Tier 1); Brandeis CMJS 2016 cross-section corroborates inclusive estimate (~14%); Hillel upper-bound scenario for reference. Direction confirmed across all three independent sources.
Jewish enrollment at Brown has not declined and has risen; at Cornell it has remained essentially stable.	Hillel: Brown ~20%→~24%; Cornell ~23%→~20%. BDH intercept poll (14%) is below Hillel but still ~2.4× Harvard on identical instrument and cohort.
The divergence between Harvard and peers is not explained by national Jewish demographic trends.	Jewish college-age population stable (~90,000/cohort; Pew 2020; Brandeis SSRI). Peers show no comparable decline.
Harvard's white enrollment share declined, but Jewish enrollment declined faster.	CDS: white 45%→30% (-33% relative). Crimson: Jewish self-ID 9.8%→5.8% (-40% relative). Jewish declined ~2× faster than white using Harvard's own consistent instruments.

CLAIM	EVIDENCE
<p>Yale Jewish enrollment has declined substantially from a historical peak. Hillel baseline (2013): ~27%; current: ~12%. The Yale Chaplain's Office series corroborates a ~50% decline from a lower Chaplain-estimated baseline of ~20%; using the confirmed Hillel 27% baseline the decline reaches ~56%.</p>	<p>Three independent sources (Yale Chaplain's Office, Yale Daily News, Hillel) converge on ~10–12% current.</p>
<p>Jewish enrollment decline is not a mechanical consequence of white enrollment decline.</p>	<p>Nine-school analysis: ratio of Jewish to white decline varies enormously across institutions. No meaningful cross-school correlation.</p>
<p>Asian enrollment growth does not predict Jewish enrollment decline.</p>	<p>Penn, Brown, and Cornell all experienced ~10 pp Asian growth with radically different Jewish outcomes: Penn -31%, Cornell -13%, Brown 0% to +20% (instrument-dependent).</p>
<p>Harvard's geographic rebalancing reduced seats from Jewish-dense regions.</p>	<p>Mid-Atlantic share: ~26% (2005–08) → ~21% (2020–25): ~83 fewer annual seats. NY enrollment: 264 → 160 (1992–2024): ~26 fewer Jewish students annually from this substitution.</p>
<p>Brown's terminal-point equivalence falsifies geography as primary cause.</p>	<p>Brown diversified 1.68× more (1992–2024) and arrived at same endpoint (38.7% vs. 38.3% NE+Mid-Atl.), yet maintained ~24% Jewish enrollment vs. Harvard's ~7%.</p>
<p>Geographic rebalancing was dormant during the largest phase of Jewish decline.</p>	<p>Era 1 (1992–2004): -6.3 pp NE+Mid-Atl., Jewish enrollment stable. Era 2 (2004–2014): -1.5 pp, ~183 students already lost. Temporal inversion — Level A falsification.</p>

† Multiple independent sources confirm; would be revised only by new institutional data.

### A.8.2 LEVEL B: SUPPORTED, REQUIRING ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE

**Table A.8.2. Claims at Level B: Supported, Requiring Additional Evidence**

CLAIM	EVIDENCE	LIMITATION
Socioeconomic targeting contributes to Harvard's outcome but does not explain the peer divergence.	Domestic-adjusted aid rates (matched 2013–24 window): Harvard 83%→87% (+4.4 pp, flat); Brown 76%→76% (+0.6 pp, flat). Both schools essentially unchanged in domestic targeting intensity. Stanford higher-aid-growth peer shows worse Jewish outcome. Aid rate differential is one contributing dimension, not the operative cause.	All nine schools had comparable socioeconomic shifts but divergent Jewish outcomes; financial aid describes one dimension, not a complete explanation.
Harvard's high historical Jewish enrollment (20–25% through the 1990s) should have produced a substantial legacy tailwind for recent Jewish applicants; instead enrollment collapsed to approximately 7%, suggesting the legacy mechanism, if operative, was insufficient to offset countervailing admissions forces.	Decades of 20–25% Jewish enrollment give Jewish alumni ~15% of the legacy pool; SFFA: 20.5% of white admits were legacies. Enrollment fell to 7% regardless.	No cross-tabulation of Jewish identity and legacy status in public data. Testable via unpublished Crimson data.
International enrollment growth contributes additively at Harvard but is not the primary driver.	Harvard +4.3 pp int'l (largest of clean comparators in the matched 2014–24 window).	Cannot isolate net displacement without religion-coded pipeline data.

† Evidence for Level B claims is drawn from the same six data sources listed in Appendix A. Claims at this level are directionally supported but would require additional institutional confirmation to be elevated to Level A.

### A.8.3 LEVEL C: LOW CONFIDENCE (INFERENTIAL / SPECULATIVE)

**Table A.8.3. Inferences at Level C: Low Confidence (Inferential / Speculative)**

CLAIM	BASIS	LIMITATION
Harvard’s admissions criteria, applied consistently and facially neutrally, produce a structurally disparate outcome for Jewish applicants that cannot be explained by demographic or competitive factors.	Nine-school comparative analysis falsifies demographic, competitive, and compositional alternatives; Harvard’s J/WNJ outlier status persists after all available structural controls.	Structural disparity does not establish intent or identify a specific policy cause; unmeasured confounders cannot be excluded.
Specific policy changes caused the decline.	Timing suggestive. Note: geographic rebalancing affirmatively falsified as primary cause (Level A – temporal inversion + Brown terminal-point test).	Correlation ≠ causation; peers implemented similar policies without similar outcomes.
The decline will continue absent intervention.	Crimson recent cohorts average ~5.8%, below 10-cohort average of 7.2%. C/O 2025 uptick (7.4%) introduces uncertainty.	Future trends depend on policy and applicant behavior, which may change.

† Level C claims are inferential. They are included to represent the outer boundary of what the available data could support and should not be cited as established findings.

### A.8.4 WHAT THIS REPORT DOES NOT CLAIM

1. That Harvard has a “quota” on Jewish students. The report documents an outcome pattern, not a policy.
2. That any individual was rejected because they are Jewish. The analysis is statistical.
3. That Harvard admissions officers are antisemitic. The mechanisms that may produce disparate impact are formally neutral and may be implemented without anti-Jewish intent.
4. That the exact figures are precise. The directional finding is robust; exact percentages are not.
5. That Brown and Cornell are free of problems. The report uses peers as a comparison, not as models.

## A.9 SOURCE CATALOG: JEWISH ENROLLMENT DATA — PENN, YALE, PRINCETON, BROWN

This section provides a consolidated, auditable catalog of all primary and secondary sources used to establish Jewish enrollment baselines and current figures for the four schools with multiple competing data sources. Every source figure used in the stacking analysis (Appendix F) traces to a row in Table A.9.1. Sources rated LOW  are included for transparency but are not used as baselines. For Harvard’s multi-source hierarchy and calibration multiplier specifically, see Section A.3.

### A.9.1 SOURCE CATALOG: ALL JEWISH ENROLLMENT FIGURES, PENN / YALE / PRINCETON / BROWN

**Table A.9.1. Jewish Enrollment Sources: Penn, Yale, Princeton, Brown — All Available Data Points**

UNIVERSITY	SOURCE	PERIOD	FIGURE	MEASURE / METHODOLOGY	RELIABILITY / SAMPLE
Penn	Brandeis CMJS/ SSRI — Saxe et al. (2016)	2015–16	13% relig. / 16% incl.	Random sample from registrar; religion question + follow-up inclusive question	HIGH — peer-reviewed; n=1,113; 44.7% RR (AAPOR RR2)
Penn	Brandeis SSRI (unpublished campus study)	~2010	~20%	Religious self-ID only. Methodology unknown — not publicly released	LOW — unpublished; cited secondhand Tablet Mag. 2018. NOT USED as baseline.
Penn	Hillel International (Wayback ~2013–14)	~2013–14	26%	Inclusive Hillel estimate — local chapter self-report	LOW — documented 40–60% overestimation vs. Brandeis. Upper bound only.
Yale	Yale Chaplain’s Office (chaplain. yale.edu/ religious-diversity-at-yale-accessible-data)	2000s avg (classes 2005–08)	19.88%	Religious self-ID only; freshman registration form (voluntary). 4 of ~10 years. ~46% completion (c.2011–14 per Yale Alumni Magazine Jan/Feb 2012).	MEDIUM — incomplete decade; no per-year response rates
Yale	Yale Chaplain’s Office (same source)	2010s avg (classes 2010–20)	16.42%	Same instrument. Most complete decade — all 11 classes present.	MEDIUM-HIGH — full decade coverage; voluntary form
Yale	Yale Chaplain’s Office (same source)	2021–2024 avg	9.93%	Year-by-year: 9.90% / 10.10% / 10.20% / 9.50%. Same voluntary form. No response rates provided.	MEDIUM — most recent; consistent with YDN 10% (n=864)

JEWISH UNDERGRADUATE ENROLLMENT AT HARVARD AND ITS PEERS

UNIVERSITY	SOURCE	PERIOD	FIGURE	MEASURE / METHODOLOGY	RELIABILITY / SAMPLE
Yale	Yale Daily News Class of 2022 Survey	Fall 2018 (class of 2022)	10%	Freshman survey; religion as exclusive categories (Atheist/Agnostic treated as non-Jewish). Undercounts secular Jews.	MEDIUM – n=864/1,578; 54.75% RR. Cross-check only.
Yale	Hillel International (Reform Judaism Insider’s Guide, ~2013–14)	~2013–14	27%	Inclusive Hillel estimate – local chapter self-report. No independent corroboration.	LOW – inflated per Saxe et al. 2018. No source confirms 22–23%+ baseline.
Princeton	CIRP / Fred Hargadon – “Just Plain Wrong” (Princeton Alumni Weekly)	1988–2003 avg	10.5%	CIRP Freshman Survey (UCLA HERI); religious self-ID. Annual data; admissions dean with direct CIRP access. Year-to-year range 9–13%. Harvard and Yale did NOT participate in CIRP.	HIGH – institutional (full cohort); primary baseline
Princeton	Daily Princetonian Class of 2023 Senior Survey	Spring 2023	8.3%	Online senior survey; religious self-ID. Consistent with current Hillel figure of 8.6%.	MEDIUM-HIGH – 44.1% RR of 1,296 seniors
Princeton	Hillel International 2024–25	Current (2024–25)	8.6%	Inclusive Hillel estimate – 450 students / 5,236 UGs. Recent Hillel figures appear more calibrated than pre-2018 estimates.	MEDIUM – post-recalibration era; cross-check only
Brown	Brown Daily Herald Fall 2024 Undergraduate Poll	Fall 2024	14%	In-person intercept poll at 3 campus locations (Sep 24–26, 2024). Religious self-ID only. Largest documented gap vs. Hillel for any school in dataset (14% relig. vs. 23.9% Hillel). Validates dual-scenario framework.	MEDIUM – n=1,177; ±3 pp MoE (est.); non-random intercept
Brown	Hillel International 2024–25	Current (2024–25)	23.9%	Inclusive Hillel estimate – 1,700 / ~7,115 UGs. ~10 pp gap vs. BDH religious figure likely explained by high secular Jewish population at Brown (consistent with Open Curriculum culture).	LOW-MEDIUM – post-2018 recalibration

† Sources: Brandeis CMJS/SSRI (2016) [hdl.handle.net/10192/33071](https://hdl.handle.net/10192/33071). Yale Chaplain’s Office [chaplain.yale.edu/religious-diversity-at-yale-accessible-data](https://chaplain.yale.edu/religious-diversity-at-yale-accessible-data). Brandeis SSRI unpublished ~2010 cited secondhand: Tablet Magazine (2018). CIRP/Hargadon: [paw.princeton.edu/article/just-plain-wrong](https://paw.princeton.edu/article/just-plain-wrong). Daily Princetonian: [dailyprincetonian.com](https://dailyprincetonian.com). BDH: [browndailyherald.com](https://browndailyherald.com). Hillel International: [hillel.org/college](https://hillel.org/college) (individual school pages). Reliability ratings: HIGH = peer-reviewed random sample or full-cohort institutional data. MEDIUM-HIGH = solid methodology, stated RR ≥40%. MEDIUM = voluntary survey with stated methodology. LOW-MEDIUM = Hillel post-2018 recalibration. LOW = Hillel pre-2018, unpublished, or single secondhand citation. Figures marked ⚠️ LOW are documented in this table for transparency but are NOT used as baselines in the stacking analysis.

## A.9.2 RELIABILITY RATING LEGEND

**Table A.9.2. Source Reliability Rating Definitions**

RATING	DEFINITION
HIGH	Peer-reviewed publication or institutional full-cohort data (e.g., CIRP administered by admissions dean; Brandeis random sample with $\geq 40\%$ RR)
MEDIUM-HIGH	Solid survey with stated methodology and response rate $\geq 40\%$
MEDIUM	Self-reported voluntary survey with stated methodology; single-source corroboration available
LOW-MEDIUM	Hillel estimate post-2018 recalibration; plausible but not independently verified
LOW 	Hillel pre-2018 (documented overestimation), unpublished with unknown methodology, or cited secondhand only. NOT used as primary baselines.

† These ratings follow Saxe et al. (2018) “How Many Jewish Undergraduates?” (*eJewishPhilanthropy*) for Hillel calibration guidance. Peer-reviewed sources are rated independently of Hillel assessments.

## APPENDIX B

# Harvard Crimson Freshman Survey: Data Series and Methodology

This appendix presents the complete Harvard Crimson freshman survey dataset used throughout this report. The Crimson surveys entering freshmen annually; data are available for 10 cohorts (Classes of 2017–2027, excluding Class of 2026, for which no survey was published). All figures are entering-class self-reports with response rates ranging from approximately 79 percent (Class of 2017) to 45.8 percent (Class of 2027, the only exact published figure), declining over the course of the series. Data extracted from features.thecrimson.com; where Datawrapper-hosted charts permitted CSV export, values were cross-verified against source files.

**Key limitation:** The Crimson survey captures religious self-identification only. This systematically undercounts total Jewish enrollment by approximately 30–37 percent (the secular/cultural Jewish population who do not identify by religion on the survey). The calibration multiplier (1.43×–1.57×; Appendix A.3) converts religious-ID figures to inclusive estimates. In relative-change calculations, the multiplier cancels.

**Instrument validation note.** The question of whether the opt-in format of the Crimson freshman survey skews results is addressed by the Crimson’s own annual Senior Survey. Each year since at least 2022, the Senior Survey methodology has included a formal bias check: respondent demographics are compared against Harvard’s publicly reported institutional data for gender, race, and ethnicity. The methodology sections of the Classes of 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025 each report that respondents were ‘in line with the demographics of the broader student body.’ (The Class of 2025 section substituted ‘broadly in line,’ a slight softening worth noting.)

Religion is not a Harvard-reported institutional category, so it cannot be directly validated by this method.

**The inference.** The reasoning is: if opt-in response propensity is unbiased on verifiable dimensions (race, gender) across four consecutive cohorts, there is no identified mechanism by which it would be selectively biased for religion. The early-cluster figures (9.8% religious-ID), when calibrated to an inclusive basis using the 1.43–1.57× multiplier, produce approximately 14–15%, which is approximately consistent with the 2016 Brandeis inclusive estimate of 14%. Systematic over-response would produce a calibrated figure well above Brandeis, not in line with it. The response bias objection, while legitimate to raise, is not supported by the available evidence.

**Survey coverage and published response rates.** The Crimson publishes approximate response rates in its annual methodology notes. Rates used in this analysis: Class of 2017 ~79% (‘nearly 80%’); Classes of 2018–2020 ~71% (‘more than 70%’); Class of 2021 ~51% (‘more than 50%’); Class of 2022 ~65%; Class of 2023 ~55%; Class of 2024 ~76%; Class of 2025 ~78%; Class of 2027: 45.8% (exact figure, the only year with a precise published rate). Conservative survey N floor = class size (CDS B2) × published rate.

**Critical unknown.** The published response rate covers the full survey instrument; religion-question completion within the survey is not separately reported. The 95% confidence intervals in Appendix B.15 assume 100% religion-question completion, which slightly overstates precision at the margin.

## B.1 JEWISH RELIGIOUS SELF-IDENTIFICATION, ENTERING CLASSES 2017–2027

**Table B.1. Jewish Religious Self-Identification, Harvard Entering Classes 2017–2027**

ENTERING CLASS	JEWISH (RELIGIOUS SELF-ID %)	NOTES
Class of 2017	9.5%	Early cluster
Class of 2018	9.8%	Early cluster
Class of 2019	10.1%	Early cluster; series peak
Class of 2020	6.3%	Sharp drop: -3.8 pp from prior year – largest single-year decline in series
Class of 2021	7.7%	—
Class of 2022	5.4%	—
Class of 2023	5.3%	Recent cluster
Class of 2024	5.2%	Recent cluster
Class of 2025	7.4%	Recent cluster; notable uptick – uncertainty re stabilization
Class of 2026	—	No survey published
Class of 2027	5.4%	Recent cluster
Early cluster avg. (2017–2019)	9.8%	—
Late cluster avg. (2023–2027)	~5.8%	—
10-cohort average	~7.2%	—
Relative decline (early→late)	≈-40% (cluster-to-cluster; early avg 9.8% → late avg 5.8%)	On religious self-ID only; inclusive decline likely larger

† Source: Harvard Crimson Freshman Survey, annual Class Profile ([features.thecrimson.com](https://features.thecrimson.com)). Jewish = religious self-identification only; does not capture secular or cultural Jewish identity. See Appendix A, Section A.3 for the calibration multiplier applied to derive total Jewish enrollment estimates.

## B.2 WHITE / CAUCASIAN SELF-IDENTIFICATION, HARVARD ENTERING CLASSES 2017–2027

**Table B.2. White / Caucasian Self-Identification, Entering Classes 2017–2027**

ENTERING CLASS	WHITE / CAUCASIAN (%)
Class of 2017	61.7%
Class of 2018	62.1%
Class of 2019	58.2%
Class of 2020	55.7%
Class of 2021	52.1%
Class of 2022	46.0%
Class of 2023	47.2%
Class of 2024	49.8%
Class of 2025	53.1%
Class of 2027	42.5%

† Self-reported ethnicity; differs from CDS/IPEDS categories. Many Jewish students identify as both Jewish and White/Caucasian. Crimson white self-ID fell 31% (61.7%→42.5%) while Jewish self-ID fell 43% (9.5%→5.4%) over the same window, Jewish declined at a steeper relative rate.

## B.3 REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION, HARVARD ENTERING CLASSES 2017–2027

**Table B.3. Regional Distribution, Entering Classes 2017–2027**

CLASS	NORTHEAST	INTERNATIONAL	SOUTHEAST	MIDWEST	SOUTHWEST	WEST
2017	41.1%	—	11.7%	13.8%	7.8%	14.5%
2018	43.1%	11.6%	10.6%	11.0%	6.8%	16.9%
2019	38.3%	11.2%	12.5%	12.3%	7.0%	18.5%
2020	39.2%	12.6%	12.0%	11.2%	6.7%	18.1%
2021	39.4%	12.4%	13.3%	12.3%	6.9%	15.6%
2022	42.2%	12.3%	10.9%	11.5%	7.1%	15.9%
2023	40.3%	14.5%	10.5%	13.2%	6.4%	14.8%
2024	41.3%	10.8%	13.7%	12.0%	7.3%	14.7%
2025	38.1%	16.2%	12.2%	11.4%	6.2%	15.1%
2027	39.4%	16.6%	11.1%	12.9%	6.1%	13.7%

† C/O 2017 did not report international students separately. NE = Northeast (home to ~48% of U.S. Jewish population). Northeast share fell from 43.1% (C/O 2018) to 39.4% (C/O 2027) while international share rose from 11.6% to 16.6%. Note: ‘International’ in the Crimson ethnicity table is a self-identification category: students who identify their ethnic background as international rather than by a specific racial or national group.

## B.4 FAMILY INCOME DISTRIBUTION, HARVARD ENTERING CLASSES 2017–2027

**Table B.4. Family Income Distribution, Entering Classes 2017–2027**

CLASS	<\$40K	\$40–80K	\$80–125K	\$125–250K	\$250–500K	\$500K+
2017	14.5%	14.9%	18.3%	24.0%	14.5%	13.8%
2018	13.3%	13.9%	17.0%	22.2%	19.1%	14.4%
2019	14.3%	13.3%	15.8%	23.1%	18.1%	15.4%
2020	14.5%	11.5%	15.9%	23.3%	19.3%	15.6%
2021	12.0%	14.5%	14.2%	24.3%	17.9%	17.1%
2022	14.4%	14.8%	16.3%	21.8%	15.8%	17.0%
2023	13.1%	14.9%	12.4%	18.5%	11.4%	10.9%
2024	15.5%	13.3%	13.3%	15.6%	13.2%	11.5%
2025	13.9%	12.1%	12.3%	18.9%	13.5%	12.6%
2027	10.3%	12.7%	12.5%	19.4%	13.8%	13.4%

† Columns may not sum to 100% due to “prefer not to say” category (not shown). American Jews are concentrated in higher income brackets: ~56% of Jewish households earn \$100,000+ (Pew 2020).

## B.5 PARENT LEGACY STATUS, HARVARD ENTERING CLASSES 2018–2027

**Table B.5. Parent Legacy Status, Entering Classes 2018–2027**

CLASS	ONE PARENT LEGACY (%)	TWO PARENTS LEGACY (%)	COMBINED (%)
2018	12.3%	3.6%	15.9%
2019	12.3%	4.5%	16.8%
2020	11.0%	3.6%	14.6%
2021	12.1%	6.2%	18.3%
2022	10.8%	3.7%	14.5%
2023	12.8%	4.0%	16.8%
2024	9.8%	2.6%	12.4%
2025	10.4%	5.1%	15.5%
2027	8.8%	3.2%	12.0%

† Legacy data not available for C/O 2017. Given decades of ~20–25% Jewish enrollment, a disproportionate share of legacy-eligible families are Jewish, yet Jewish enrollment fell from ~14% (Brandeis CMJS 2016, preferred baseline) to ~7% despite this structural tailwind.

## B.6 INCOME PROFILE OF LEGACY STUDENTS, HARVARD ENTERING CLASSES 2018–2027

**Table B.6. Income Profile of Legacy Students, Entering Classes 2018–2027**

CLASS	LEGACY FROM <\$40K FAMILIES (%)	LEGACY FROM \$500K+ FAMILIES (%)
2018	0.0%	37.3%
2019	0.6%	43.2%
2020	0.6%	26.6%
2021	1.4%	46.0%
2022	0.7%	46.4%
2023	1.4%	27.0%
2024	0.8%	32.6%
2025	0.0%	30.9%
2027	3.0%	29.3%

† Shares are of legacy students, not of the full entering class. High-income legacy concentration is shifting: families earning \$500K+ fell from 43.2% (C/O 2019) to 29.3% (C/O 2027) of legacy students. This erodes a channel that disproportionately benefited Jewish families.

## B.7 RECRUITED ATHLETE AND FIRST-GENERATION SHARES, HARVARD ENTERING CLASSES 2017–2027

**Table B.7. Recruited Athlete and First-Generation Shares, Entering Classes 2017–2027**

CLASS	RECRUITED ATHLETE (%)	FIRST-GENERATION (%)
2017	12.5%	—
2018	11.0%	—
2019	12.1%	15.6%
2020	10.3%	15.8%
2021	10.1%	16.3%
2022	12.2%	17.1%
2023	11.2%	17.3%
2024	10.6%	22.8%
2025	10.4%	20.0%
2027	8.0%	15.9%

† First-generation data not available for C/O 2017 or 2018. C/O 2027 recruited athlete share (8.0%) marks a notable decline from ~12%; if sustained, would free ~75 seats per class.

## B.8 RELIGIOSITY DISTRIBUTION, HARVARD ENTERING CLASSES 2017–2027

**Table B.8. Religiosity Distribution, Entering Classes 2017–2027**

CLASS	NOT AT ALL (%)	NOT VERY (%)	SOMEWHAT (%)	VERY (%)	EXTREMELY (%)
2017	31.0%	26.0%	19.0%	17.0%	7.0%
2018	34.0%	25.0%	18.0%	17.0%	6.0%
2019	33.6%	27.0%	24.9%	12.7%	1.8%
2020	34.8%	25.5%	24.9%	12.1%	2.7%
2021	38.2%	25.8%	25.1%	14.5%	1.9%
2022	34.3%	23.4%	25.7%	14.3%	2.2%
2023	32.8%	25.5%	26.4%	13.4%	1.8%
2024	31.7%	25.6%	27.5%	13.1%	2.0%
2025	32.3%	21.5%	29.1%	14.7%	2.4%
2027	33.9%	28.6%	23.0%	12.0%	2.5%

† “Not at all religious” rose from 31.0% (C/O 2017) to a peak of 38.2% (C/O 2021) before falling back to 33.9% (C/O 2027), a net increase of only 2.9 pp with a non-monotonic trajectory. Consistent with real but modest secularization pressure on religion-based survey instruments.

## B.9 TOP CHOICE AND EARLY ACTION RATES, HARVARD ENTERING CLASSES 2017–2027

**Table B.9. Top Choice and Early Action Rates, Entering Classes 2017–2027**

CLASS	HARVARD TOP CHOICE (%)	HARVARD EARLY ACTION (%)
2017	81.1%	50.2%
2018	83.0%	56.0%
2019	81.8%	55.5%
2020	79.0%	50.8%
2021	81.3%	53.4%
2022	79.8%	56.8%
2023	80.4%	54.8%
2024	81.0%	50.0%
2025	78.8%	43.6%
2027	75.4%	— (methodology changed)*

† \*C/O 2027 EA methodology changed: survey split Harvard Early Action (33.9%) from Harvard & Another School Early (7.6%). Not directly comparable to prior years. Harvard remained the #1 or #2 “dream school” in Princeton Review annual surveys throughout the 2010s and early 2020s.

## B.10 FULL ETHNICITY BREAKDOWN, HARVARD ENTERING CLASSES 2017–2027

Note: Table B.2 shows White/Caucasian self-identification only. Note: the international enrollment section (Appendix D.5) covers all international students regardless of citizenship or visa type, including students from all countries. This section presents the complete Crimson ethnicity series, showing which groups have gained share as White self-identification fell from 61.7% (C/O 2017) to 42.5% (C/O 2027). South Asian is reported separately from Asian/Asian-Am. beginning C/O 2019; 2021 did not break out South Asian separately. 2026 survey not published.

**Table B.10. Full Ethnicity Self-Identification, Harvard Entering Classes 2017–2027**

CLASS	WHITE	ASIAN / ASIAN-AM.	HISPANIC / LATINX	BLACK / AFRICAN-AM.	SOUTH ASIAN	AM. INDIAN	PACIFIC ISLANDER	BIPOC TOTAL*
2017	61.7%	25.2%	10.8%	9.7%	4.1%	1.4%	1.1%	52.3%
2018	62.1%	24.3%	11.9%	11.0%	4.5%	1.1%	1.1%	53.9%
2019	58.2%	23.5%	12.5%	11.2%	6.5%	1.4%	0.7%	55.8%
2020	55.7%	26.6%	13.1%	11.4%	6.3%	1.9%	0.6%	59.9%
2021	52.1%	23.8%	10.2%	11.4%	—	1.7%	0.8%	47.9%
2022	46.0%	18.1%	6.5%	10.7%	3.8%	0.6%	0.1%	39.8%
2023	47.2%	22.6%	11.1%	10.1%	5.8%	1.2%	0.8%	51.6%
2024	49.8%	29.1%	13.4%	15.8%	4.8%	1.9%	0.5%	65.5%
2025	53.1%	23.6%	13.4%	15.7%	8.3%	0.9%	0.6%	62.5%
2027	42.5%	25.0%	9.4%	11.1%	7.9%	1.5%	0.7%	55.6%

† Source: Harvard Crimson Freshman Survey, Ethnicity section. Self-reported; respondents may select multiple categories. \*Non-White Total = Hispanic/Latinx + Am. Indian + Asian/Asian-Am. + South Asian + Black/African-Am. + Pacific Islander (excludes White and Prefer Not to Say). 2021 South Asian not separately reported; included in Asian/Asian-Am. for that year.

## B.11 ETHNICITY OF RECRUITED ATHLETES, HARVARD ENTERING CLASSES 2023–2027

Four years of Crimson data (Classes 2023–2027, excluding 2026) identify which entering students were recruited athletes and their reported ethnicity. The data show recruited athletes are overwhelmingly White, running at 62.5–82.9% across years. Given that athletic slots constitute 8–12% of the entering class and athletes are disproportionately White, athletic recruitment concentrates within the same White demographic pool in which Jewish applicants compete. It does not displace Jewish applicants toward minority categories, as sometimes assumed.

**Table B.11. Ethnicity of Recruited Athletes, Harvard Entering Classes 2023–2027**

CLASS	WHITE / CAUCASIAN	HISPANIC / LATINX	BLACK / AFRICAN-AM.	ASIAN / ASIAN-AM.	SOUTH ASIAN	AM. INDIAN	PACIFIC ISLANDER
2023	74.5%	6.1%	6.1%	7.1%	2.0%	3.1%	0.0%
2024	72.9%	14.0%	12.1%	13.1%	0.9%	2.8%	0.9%
2025	82.9%*	7.5%	10.3%	8.2%	2.1%	0.0%	1.4%
2027	62.5%	7.8%	9.4%	6.3%	9.4%	1.6%	0.0%

† Source: Harvard Crimson Freshman Survey, Athletics section ([features.thecrimson.com/2023/freshman-survey/academics/](https://features.thecrimson.com/2023/freshman-survey/academics/)). Data available via slider for C/O 2023–2027; 2026 not published. \*C/O 2025 White figure (82.9%) verified against source; the higher value reflects cohort variation, not a data error. Rows may not sum to 100% as respondents may select multiple categories.

## B.12 FAMILY INCOME AMONG RECRUITED ATHLETES, HARVARD ENTERING CLASSES 2019–2027

A common counterargument to the stacking thesis holds that athletic recruitment serves a socioeconomic diversity function for families of modest means. The Crimson income data refute this: recruited athletes are concentrated at middle-to-upper income levels, with the sub-\$40K cohort consistently among the smallest income segments. In most years, athletes earning \$125K+ account for the majority of athletes with reported income. Athletic recruitment at Harvard does not primarily expand low-income access.

**Table B.12. Family Income of Recruited Athletes, Harvard Entering Classes 2019–2027**

CLASS	UNDER \$40K	\$40K–\$79,999	\$80K–\$124,999	\$125K–\$249,999	\$250K–\$499,999	\$500K+	PREFER NOT TO SAY
2019	4.5%	13.0%	9.8%	10.6%	15.1%	20.1%	—
2020	4.2%	6.7%	14.3%	31.9%	21.9%	21.0%	—
2021	5.0%	12.5%	12.5%	31.3%	16.3%	22.5%	—
2022	3.7%	8.7%	18.8%	22.5%	20.0%	26.3%	—
2023	5.2%	13.5%	13.4%	15.6%	10.4%	13.5%	28.1%
2024	4.8%	4.8%	9.6%	19.2%	18.3%	11.5%	31.7%
2025	3.6%	9.3%	15.7%	25.7%	10.7%	9.3%	25.7%
2027	7.6%	15.1%	5.7%	28.3%	18.9%	5.7%	18.9%

† Source: Harvard Crimson Freshman Survey, Family Income among Recruited Athletes section. Data not available for C/O 2017–2018 or 2026. “Prefer Not to Say” not reported in 2019–2022 surveys. Columns may not sum to 100% due to rounding.

### B.13 FIRST-GENERATION RATE BY ETHNIC GROUP, HARVARD ENTERING CLASSES 2022–2027

**First-generation rates by ethnicity.** This table shows what share of each ethnic group’s students in the entering class are first-generation college students. It is distinct from the overall first-gen share of the class (Table B.7). The data quantify the ethnic specificity of socioeconomic targeting: when Harvard recruits first-generation students, it draws from Hispanic/Latinx and Black pools at rates 3–5 times higher than from White or South Asian pools.

Jewish applicants, who skew toward continuing-generation households (~89% White first-gen rate is itself a ceiling for the Jewish sub-population), are on the lowest-rate end of this distribution.

**Table B.13. First-Generation Rate by Ethnic Group: % of Each Group That Is First-Generation, Harvard Entering Classes 2022–2027**

ETHNIC GROUP	C/O 2022 (EST.)	C/O 2023	C/O 2024	C/O 2025	C/O 2027	TREND
Hispanic or Latinx	~41%	51.0%	—	46.8%	35.8%	↓ Declining
American Indian / Alaska Native	~38%	47.0%	47.0%	16.7%	38.5%	≈ Variable
Asian (excl. South Asia)	~15%	19.0%	—	15.4%	17.1%	≈ Stable
South Asian	—	—	15.0%	25.6%	7.5%	— Partial
Black / African-American	~24%	28.0%	28.0%	25.0%	15.1%	↓ Declining
White (incl. MENA)	~10%	16.0%	16.0%	12.0%	11.2%	≈ Stable/low
Pacific Islander	~28%	20.0%	20.0%	11.0%	100%*	— Small n

† Source: Harvard Crimson Freshman Survey, First Gen Ethnicity section (Section 1: first-gen rate by ethnic group). METRIC: Of all students identifying as [ethnicity], what % are first-generation? C/O 2022 estimated from unlabeled bars (±5 pp). C/O 2024 labeled values; some groups not reported (shown as —). \*C/O 2027 Pacific Islander first-gen rate = 100%, reflecting the small Pacific Islander cohort that year. This is not directly comparable to other rows due to small n.

## B.14 RACIAL IDENTITY IN APPLICATION ESSAYS (C/O 2027 ONLY)

**Post-SFFA racial identity data.** The Class of 2027 Crimson survey included a new question – introduced following the June 2023 SFFA ruling banning race-conscious admissions – asking whether students mentioned their racial identity in application essays and whether they felt pressure to do so. These data are referenced in Appendix D.4 (The Double Bind) and provide context for how racial identity continues to function as a signal in the post-SFFA review process. The data are limited to a single cohort and should be treated with caution; no pre-SFFA baseline exists for direct comparison.

They are included here because they are directly relevant to the holistic evaluation configuration hypothesis in Appendix A.8: if 38.7% of admitted students proactively disclosed racial identity in essays and 15.2% felt pressure to do so, racial identity continues to function as a signal in the review process even in the post-SFFA environment.

**Table B.14. Racial Identity in Application Essays: Class of 2027**

QUESTION (C/O 2027 ONLY)	YES	NO	IMPLICATION
Mentioned racial identity in application essays	38.7%	61.3%	Post-SFFA applicant behavior
Felt pressure to mention racial identity in application essays	15.2%	84.8%	Admissions signaling effect

† Source: Harvard Crimson Freshman Survey, Class of 2027, Racial Identity in Essays section. Single cohort only – question was introduced post-SFFA ruling (June 2023) and does not exist in prior surveys. Data labeled; response rate consistent with the overall Crimson survey for this cohort (~45.8%). “Yes” on pressure question (15.2%) should be interpreted as a lower bound, as social desirability bias may suppress disclosure of perceived pressure.

## B.15 STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TREND

These sections document the statistical significance of the Harvard Jewish enrollment trend and directly answer the most common methodological objections. B.15.1–B.15.3 establish that the decline is significant under multiple tests. B.15.4 answers the secularization/identity-hiding objection: if the decline reflected identity-hiding rather than enrollment, the Jewish series would look anomalous compared to other religious groups — and it does not.

**B.15.1 Formal Hypothesis Tests.** Two-proportion z-tests comparing Class of 2019 (10.1%,  $N \geq 11,178$ ) against each subsequent class year, at 100% and 80% religion-question completion. 2019 vs. 2027:  $z = 3.66$ ,  $p < 0.001$  at 100% completion;  $z = 3.27$ ,  $p = 0.0005$  at 80% completion. Significant under all plausible  $N$  assumptions. All post-2019 classes produce significant z-scores at both completion assumptions.

What this means: Every class after 2019 shows a statistically significant drop in Jewish self-identification — this cannot be attributed to random variation or small samples.

**B.15.2 Trend Tests.** Mann-Kendall:  $\tau = -0.539$ ,  $p = 0.031$ . OLS regression: slope =  $-0.47$  pp/year,  $R^2 = 0.576$ ,  $p = 0.011$ , 95% CI  $[-0.75, -0.19]$ . Note on Class of 2025 spike (7.4%): produces non-monotonicity. A two-period regime framing is more robust than a single linear trend claim.

What this means: Both the trend direction and its steepness are statistically confirmed. The Class of 2025 uptick does not invalidate the overall downward pattern.

**B.15.3 Two-Period Regime Analysis.** Classes 2017–2019 average 9.8% (SD 0.30%) vs. Classes 2022–2027 average 5.7% (SD 0.93%). No post-2021 year approaches the 2017–2019 range even at upper CI bound.

What this means: The two eras are statistically distinct populations. No post-2021 class comes close to the 2017–2019 baseline, even at the upper confidence bound.

**B.15.4 Multi-Religion Comparison.** Full ten-cohort comparison for Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, and No Religion. Summary: Protestant  $-70\%$  relative (20.1%  $\rightarrow$  6.1%), Catholic  $-26\%$ , Jewish  $-43\%$ , No Religion  $+42\%$ . Rebuttal function: Protestant decline exceeds Jewish in relative terms with no campus-climate concealment mechanism, directly answering the secularization/self-identification objection.

If the measured Jewish decline were primarily an artifact of identity-hiding, the Jewish series would need to be uniquely large relative to other groups and concentrated post-October 7, 2023. It is neither. The full multi-religion comparison and its implications for survey behavior are in Appendix B.15.

**Second rebuttal: Protestant comparison.** The Crimson data supply a second rebuttal. Protestant self-identification fell 70 percent in relative terms on the same instrument across the same ten cohorts, with no campus-climate mechanism that would cause Protestant students to conceal their identity on a survey. Their decline reflects broader demographic secularization. Note: Protestant national demographics have declined more steeply than Jewish national demographics over this period, so the absolute magnitude of decline is not

directly comparable; the rebuttal function here is the absence of concealment incentive, not the exact rate.

What this means: Jewish decline is not uniquely large or structured like an identity-hiding effect. Protestant students declined more steeply with no concealment mechanism – secularization affects all groups, and the Jewish pattern is not anomalous. Notably, Yale’s secularization data exhibit the same step-function structure, confirming that abrupt shifts are consistent with genuine demographic change – which makes Harvard’s Jewish step-function decline harder, not easier, to dismiss as mere identity-shifting.

## DOES THE OPT-IN SURVEY OVERCOUNT JEWISH STUDENTS? THE RESPONSE BIAS OBJECTION EXAMINED

**The Crimson freshman survey is opt-in.** Every year, a subset of the entering class responds; others do not. The most direct methodological challenge to Crimson-based analysis is therefore this: Jewish freshmen may be more likely to respond than non-Jewish peers – a hypothesis, not a confirmed finding – potentially inflating the measured Jewish share in early years; and that over-representation may have subsequently narrowed or reversed. Under that assumption, some portion of the apparent 40 to 49 percent relative decline would reflect a change in response propensity rather than a change in enrollment.

**The Crimson’s Senior Survey provides an indirect check** on whether the Freshman Survey’s opt-in mechanism introduces response bias. Each year the Senior Survey methodology explicitly certifies that

respondent demographics were compared against Harvard’s published data for gender, race, and ethnicity, and that respondents were ‘in line with the demographics of the broader student body.’ This certification appears across four consecutive graduating classes: Classes of 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025.

The inference is direct: the same opt-in instrument, the same student population, the same self-selection dynamic. If it produces representative results on every dimension Harvard independently reports, there is no identified mechanism by which it would be selectively biased for religion on the Freshman Survey. The burden falls on a challenger to specify a concrete pathway by which Jewish students systematically over-responded from 2015 through 2019 and then under-responded after 2020, on religion alone, while remaining proportional on every verifiable dimension. That mechanism has not been identified.

There is a second structural check. If Jewish over-response were inflating the early figures, then calibrating the Crimson’s early-cluster average to an inclusive basis – on an apples-to-apples basis, adjusting the Crimson figures by applying the 1.43 to 1.6× multiplier – should produce a figure substantially above the 2016 Brandeis independent estimate of 14 percent. It does not: the calibrated early-cluster figure (approximately  $9.8\% \times 1.5 \approx 14.7\%$ ) is similar to the Brandeis figure. The multiplier was itself derived from the 2016 Brandeis/Crimson comparison, so this consistency is not fully independent evidence; but the direction of the test is informative: systematic early-year inflation would produce calibrated figures well above Brandeis, not approximately in line with it. There is no evidence of inflation in the early figures.

The response bias objection is the most serious methodological challenge to Crimson-based analysis and deserves to be treated seriously rather than dismissed. The available evidence points consistently against it: the Senior Survey validation provides no support for differential Jewish response propensity; the direction-of-bias check shows the early Crimson figures are similar when calibrated to independent data; and three independent instruments converge on the same directional finding. Formal significance tests, confidence intervals, and the multi-religion comparison are in Appendix B.15.

## B.16 CRIMSON INSTRUMENT VALIDATION: SELECTION BIAS AND STATISTICAL CONFIDENCE

The Harvard Crimson Freshman Survey is an opt-in survey. A structural concern follows: if Jewish students respond at systematically higher rates than non-Jewish students, the filed Jewish percentages overstate true enrollment, and the reported decline could be an artifact of changing response propensity rather than a genuine enrollment shift. This section documents the validation work conducted to evaluate and bound that concern.

### B.16.1 The White Over-Sampling Framework

**White over-sampling in the Crimson.** The Crimson survey consistently over-samples white students relative to the CDS-reported white share. Across all ten measured class years, the white over-sampling factor (Crimson White %  $\div$  CDS domestic White %) ranged from 1.11 $\times$  to 1.36 $\times$ , with a central estimate of approximately 1.25 $\times$ . Because Jewish Harvard students disproportionately identify as white, the survey over-samples Jewish students in proportion to its over-sampling of white students.

**Why it does not affect the trend.** The key analytical question is whether this bias changed over time. If it did not change, the bias factor divides out of any trend calculation and cannot explain the observed decline.

**Three adjustment scenarios.** Three adjustment scenarios were tested: Conservative ( $\div$ 1.10), Central ( $\div$ 1.25), and Maximum ( $\div$ 1.40). Under all three scenarios, the relative decline from the Class of 2019 peak to the Class of 2027 endpoint is approximately 47% – identical to the unadjusted figure. This mathematical result is invariant because dividing all data points by a constant preserves all ratios between them.

Selection bias can affect the absolute level of enrollment at any point in time; it cannot explain a trend unless the bias itself changed over the measurement period. No evidence of changing bias was found: response rates fluctuated but did not trend directionally, survey methodology was stable, and the white over-representation factor was consistent across class years.

APPENDIX B

**Table B.16.1. Crimson Jewish Enrollment: Filed Figures and Bias-Adjusted Range, Classes 2017–2027**

CLASS	PUBLISHED RR	FILED JEWISH %	CONS. ADJ. (+1.10)	CENTRAL ADJ. (+1.25)	MAX. ADJ. (+1.40)	95% CI (FILED, CONSERVATIVE N)
2017	~80%	9.5%	8.6%	7.6%	6.8%	[7.9%, 11.1%]
2018	~70%	9.8%	8.9%	7.8%	7.0%	[8.1%, 11.5%]
2019 ★	~70%	10.1%	9.2%	8.1%	7.2%	[8.4%, 11.8%]
2020	~70%	6.3%	5.7%	5.0%	4.5%	[4.9%, 7.7%]
2021	>50%	7.7%	7.0%	6.2%	5.5%	[5.9%, 9.5%] ⚠
2022	~65%	5.4%	4.9%	4.3%	3.9%	[4.0%, 6.8%]
2023	~55%	5.3%	4.8%	4.2%	3.8%	[3.8%, 6.8%]
2024	~76%	5.2%	4.7%	4.2%	3.7%	[3.9%, 6.5%]
2025	~78%	7.4%	6.7%	5.9%	5.3%	[6.1%, 8.7%] ⚠
2027 ★	45.8% (exact)	5.4%	4.9%	4.3%	3.9%	[3.8%, 7.0%]

★ = Trend anchor points (peak and latest). ⚠ = Widened CI due to floor-only RR (Class of 2021) or anomalous spike requiring separate interpretation (Class of 2025). Class of 2026 omitted: no religion data in survey file. CIs use binomial normal approximation with conservative N floor (Class size × published RR floor). Source: Harvard Crimson Freshman Survey, annual Class Profile ([features.thecrimson.com](https://features.thecrimson.com)). Bias adjustment methodology: [Crimson\\_Selection\\_Bias\\_Analysis\\_March\\_7.xlsx](#).

**B.16.2 Race/Ethnicity Bias Analysis**

Table B.16.2 compares the White share of the Crimson respondent pool against the White share of Harvard’s CDS-reported domestic enrollment for each class year from 2017 through 2027. The Crimson consistently over-represents White students relative to the CDS domestic baseline, with oversampling factors ranging from 1.11× to 1.36×. This systematic over-representation means that the Crimson’s racial self-identification data – including the White and non-White category shares used in the Stacking Model – must be interpreted against the CDS, not taken as a direct proxy for the enrolled class.

**Table B.16.2. Crimson vs. CDS White Share by Class Year**

CLASS YEAR	ENTERING FALL	CDS WHITE COUNT	CDS DOMESTIC	CDS WHITE %	CRIMSON WHITE %	GAP (PP)	OVERSAMPLING FACTOR
2027	2023	458	1394	32.9%	42.5%	+9.6 pp	1.29×
2025	2021	650	1662	39.1%	53.1%	+14.0 pp	1.36×
2024	2020	482	1277	37.7%	49.8%	+12.1 pp	1.32×
2023	2019	559	1430	39.1%	47.2%	+8.1 pp	1.21×
2022	2018	600	1447	41.5%	46.0%	+4.5 pp	1.11×
2021	2017	647	1493	43.3%	52.1%	+8.8 pp	1.20×
2020	2016	640	1466	43.7%	55.7%	+12.0 pp	1.28×
2019	2015	623	1441	43.2%	58.2%	+15.0 pp	1.35×
2018	2014	695	1463	47.5%	62.1%	+14.6 pp	1.31×
2017	2013	715	1472	48.6%	61.7%	+13.1 pp	1.27×

† CDS White % = CDS White count ÷ CDS Domestic total (excludes international/NRA students to match Crimson domestic frame). Oversampling Factor = Crimson White % ÷ CDS White %. Source: Common Data Set Section B2 for each class year; Harvard Crimson Freshman Survey racial self-identification question.

**B.16.3 Geographic Origin Bias Analysis**

Geographic over-sampling in the Crimson. Table B.16.3 compares the regional distribution of Crimson respondents (domestic-rebased) against IPEDS enrollment data for two anchor years. The Crimson modestly over-represents Northeastern students (the region with the highest Jewish population density) and under-represents Western students. The geographic bias is smaller in magnitude than the racial bias documented in B.16.2, but directionally consistent with mild oversampling of high-Jewish-density regions.

Both biases are conservative for the report’s core thesis: the Crimson’s oversampling of White and Northeastern students, the groups most correlated with Jewish identity, means that the Crimson-based Jewish enrollment estimates in Section B are more likely to understate than overstate the true decline.

**Table B.16.3. Crimson vs. IPEDS Regional Distribution**

REGION	CRIMSON 2018 (RAW)	CRIMSON 2018 (INTL. EXCL.)	IPEDS 2014	GAP 2018 (PP)	CRIMSON 2027 (RAW)
Northeast	43.1%	48.8%	47.9%	+0.0pp	39.4%
Southeast	10.6%	12.0%	12.2%	-0.0pp	11.1%
Midwest	11.0%	12.4%	10.1%	+0.0pp	12.9%
Southwest	6.8%	7.7%	7.5%	+0.0pp	6.1%
West	16.9%	19.1%	22.3%	-0.0pp	13.7%

† “Intl. excl.” rebases Crimson percentages to domestic-only respondents. IPEDS 2014 = Harvard enrollment survey for entering class ~2018. Gap = Crimson domestic-rebased % minus IPEDS %. Source: IPEDS Enrollment Survey (Harvard UNITID 166027); Harvard Crimson Freshman Survey state-of-origin question. Note: International/NRA students (approx. 15% of class) are excluded from Crimson rebased percentages to ensure comparability with IPEDS domestic figures.

**B.16.4 Critical Analytical Conclusion**

**Decline is invariant to bias adjustment.** The relative decline from the Class of 2019 (10.1% filed) to the Class of 2027 (5.4% filed) is approximately 47% under all three adjustment scenarios. This result is mathematically necessary: dividing all data points by a constant preserves every ratio between them.

A critic who believes the true Jewish % at each point in time is lower than filed by a factor of 1.25× is also accepting that the true decline is approximately 47%. The selection bias objection, if accepted, lowers the absolute level of Jewish enrollment — it does not shrink the decline.

The formal significance tests confirming this trend are in Appendix B.15. The Crimson instrument validation concludes that selection bias is a legitimate concern for absolute-level estimates and an immaterial concern for trend analysis.

**APPENDIX C***Enrollment Data Tables*

This appendix contains the primary enrollment data tables. CDS data present baseline (~2013) and current (2024–25) snapshots from Common Data Set Section B2. Jewish enrollment estimates are sourced from Hillel International, Brandeis CMJS/SSRI, and the Harvard Crimson as noted. No figures are interpolated; all values are taken directly from source documents.

Table groups: C.1 presents the nine-school Jewish enrollment summary. C.2 presents the demographic shift summary for all nine schools (n2013 to 2024–25). C.3 presents the nine-school White Decomposition (Jewish vs. non-Jewish White decline). C.4–C.13 give full CDS race/ethnicity breakdowns for each school individually; C.5a and C.5b present Yale Chaplain longitudinal Jewish enrollment data; C.9 addresses the Columbia General Studies denominator issue. The Princeton benchmark, four-tier outcome taxonomy, and distribution symmetry analysis appear in Appendix E (Sections E.3–E.5).

### C.1 NINE-SCHOOL JEWISH ENROLLMENT SUMMARY, 2024–2025

This table gives the headline Jewish enrollment estimate for each of the nine schools as of 2024–25, drawn from the preferred source for that school. For trend context, confidence ratings, and source details, see Appendix A.5 and Appendix A.9.

→ Enrollment figures in this table draw on the source hierarchy and calibration methodology documented in Appendix A.1–A.5. For the full White Decomposition of these figures, see Appendix C.3.

**Table C.1. Nine-School Jewish Enrollment Summary, 2024–2025**

INSTITUTION	HILLEL EST.	CONFIDENCE	INDEPENDENT CORROBORATION	TREND 2013–2025
Harvard	~7%	Medium	Crimson surveys 2017–2027; Brandeis CMJS 2016	-40%   ANOMALOUS
Brown	~24%	Medium	BDH intercept poll (Fall 2024)†	+20% (Hillel-to-Hillel)   OUTPERFORMER
Cornell	~20%	Medium	2004 institutional survey (single historical cross-check)‡	-13%   OUTPERFORMER
Penn	~11%	Medium-High	Brandeis CMJS/SSRI 2015–16 random sample (n=1,113)	-31%   NORMAL
Yale	~12%	Medium	Yale Chaplain’s Office series (1930s–2024); Yale Daily News 2022	-50%   ANOMALOUS
Princeton	~8.6%	Medium-High	CIRP via Hargadon (2006); Daily Princetonian Senior Survey 2022–2025	-20%   OUTPERFORMER
Columbia	~16%	Low	Hillel only (GS denominator unverifiable)	-29% est.   PROPORTIONAL
Dartmouth	~9%	Low	None	-19%   ANOMALOUS††
Stanford	~8%	Low	None	-21%   NORMAL

† Sources: Hillel International College Guide 2024–25. Independent corroboration sources listed by school in Appendix A, Section A.5. Trend direction based on comparison with 2013–14 Hillel estimates and available newspaper survey data. ‡ Cornell statutory college caveat: Cornell operates several colleges funded by New York State (engineering, agriculture, human ecology) which admit state residents under different criteria than the privately-funded Arts & Sciences college, giving Cornell an independent enrollment channel not available to fully private peers; this limits comparability of trend magnitude. †† Dartmouth ratio (3.55×) is a mathematical artifact driven by an unusually small White Non-Jewish decline denominator; excluded from the four-tier taxonomy primary analysis. See Appendix E.4.

## C.2 DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFT SUMMARY: ALL NINE SCHOOLS (~2013 TO 2024–25)

How to read this table: each row is one school. “Hillel Est.” is the current (2024–25) headline figure from Hillel International. “Independent Corroboration” lists other sources and whether they confirm the same direction. “Trend” compares 2024–25 to the 2013-era baseline for that school.

**Table C.2. Demographic Shift Summary: All Nine Schools (~2013 to 2024–25)**

SCHOOL	BASELINE	Δ WHITE (PP)	Δ ASIAN (PP)	Δ HISP (PP)	Δ BLACK (PP)	Δ INT'L (PP)
Harvard	2013–14	-14.9	+4.8	+2.1	+2.4	+4.3
Yale	2013–14	-16.1	+5.5	+6.5	+2.6	+0.7
Princeton	2013–14	-13.5	+3.4	+2.0	+1.1	+1.8
Penn	2015–16	-18.0	+9.5	+1.4	+1.7	+1.7
Columbia	2013	-10.5	+1.7	+1.8	+0.0	+6.0
Dartmouth	2014–15	-3.9	-1.0	+1.8	-0.6	+6.7
Brown	2013–14	-10.4	+10.6	+1.3	+1.8	+1.0
Cornell	2013–14	-11.6	+10.5	+1.9	+0.9	+0.1
Stanford	2013–14	-14.0	+9.6	+0.2	+1.1	+4.7

† Sources: CDS Section B2 for all schools except Columbia (IPEDS EF, degree-seeking UG, CC+SEAS+GS). Penn baseline 2015–16; Dartmouth baseline 2014–15; all others 2013–14. Columbia Black share essentially flat due to GS inclusion.

## C.3 NINE-SCHOOL WHITE DECOMPOSITION: JEWISH VS. NON-JEWISH WHITE

→ Three-scenario sensitivity analyses for Harvard and Yale (testing alternate baselines and endpoints) are in Appendix E.1–E.2. Princeton’s benchmark calculation is in Appendix E.3.

**White decomposition: methodology.** The table on the next page decomposes the CDS “White” category into White Jewish and White Non-Jewish at all nine schools using preferred baselines. Assumes 90% of Jewish students identify as White in official categories (Pew Research). Jewish baseline = preferred series (Brandeis SSRI / CIRP / Chaplain where available; Hillel otherwise).

**Yale instrument note.** A methodological note on Yale: pairing a religion-only baseline (Chaplain 16.4%) with an inclusive current figure (Hillel 11.8%) produces an artificially low 0.75× ratio that understates Jewish decline. This table uses the consistent-instrument Chaplain→Chaplain ratio of 1.39×. Harvard and Yale are the two anomalous schools; Princeton provides the ‘normal Ivy’ benchmark.

**Table C.3. Nine-School White Decomposition (Preferred Baselines)**

SCHOOL	PREFERRED BASELINE	BASELINE SOURCE	CURRENT JEWISH % AND SOURCE	JEW REL Δ	WNJ REL Δ	J/WNJ RATIO	CLASSIFICATION	CONSISTENT?	NOTES
Harvard	Brandeis 14%	Brandeis CMJS (2015-16)	Hillel 7.1% (2024-25)	-49.3%	-21.2%	2.33×	ANOMALOUS	✓	Only school where Jews declined FASTER than White Non-Jewish on preferred baseline. Brandeis → Hillel = inclusive both ends.
Yale	Chaplain 16.4%	Yale Chaplain (2010-20 avg)	Yale Chaplain 9.5% (2024)	-42.1%	-30.4%	1.39×	ANOMALOUS	✓	Chaplain → Chaplain (religion-only both ends). A cross-method comparison (Chaplain base → Hillel current) yields 0.75×, but this understates decline by mixing measurement instruments.
Dartmouth	Hillel 11%	Hillel (2014-15)	Hillel 8.9% (2024-25)	-19.1%	-5.4%	3.55×	ANOMALOUS†	-	† Hillel-only; low confidence. Tiny absolute numbers. Include with caveat.
Columbia	Hillel 22%	Hillel (2013)	Hillel 15.7% (2024-25)	-28.6%	-24.9%	1.15×	PROPORTIONAL	-	Near-parallel. GS denominator caveat.
Princeton	CIRP 10.5%	CIRP/Hargadon (1988-2003 avg)	DP Senior Survey 9.87% (2022-24 avg)	-6.0%	-56.4%	0.11×	OUTPERFORMER	✓	'Normal Ivy' benchmark. Jews declined LESS than White Non-Jewish. CIRP → DP = religion-only both ends.
Penn	Brandeis 16%	Brandeis CMJS (2015-16)	Hillel 11.0% (2024-25)	-31.2%	-45.8%	0.68×	NORMAL	✓	Jews declined LESS than White Non-Jewish. Brandeis inclusive → Hillel inclusive.
Stanford	Hillel 10%	Hillel (2013-14)	Hillel 7.9% (2024-25)	-21.0%	-43.3%	0.48×	NORMAL	-	Hillel-only baseline; no independent corroboration.
Cornell	Hillel 23%	Hillel (2013-14)	Hillel 20.0% (2024-25)	-13.0%	-40.3%	0.32×	OUTPERFORMER	-	Jewish enrollment substantially more stable than White Non-Jewish.
Brown	Hillel 20%	Hillel (2013-14)	BDH/Hillel 23.9% (2024-25)	+19.5%	-54.8%	N/C (inverted)	OUTPERFORMER	-	Jews INCREASED while White Non-Jewish collapsed 55%. Strongest outperformer.

† Jewish baseline = preferred series (see Appendix A, Section A.5 for source quality); current = Hillel except where noted. "Consistent?" = whether baseline and current use the same measurement instrument. Sorted by ratio descending (most anomalous first). Dartmouth ratio is high (3.55×) but on Hillel-only data with tiny absolute Jewish numbers, treat as low confidence.

## C.4 HARVARD UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATE ENROLLMENT BY RACE/ETHNICITY

**Table C.4. Harvard University Undergraduate Enrollment by Race/Ethnicity (CDS Section B2)**

CATEGORY	2013-14 COUNT	2013-14 %	2024-25 COUNT	2024-25 %	CHANGE (PP)
Total Undergraduates	6,671	—	6,979	—	+308
White (Non-Hispanic)	2,989	44.8%	2,088	29.9%	-14.9
Asian / Asian-American	1,253	18.8%	1,647	23.6%	+4.8
Hispanic / Latino	630	9.4%	806	11.6%	+2.1
Black / African-American	443	6.6%	628	9.0%	+2.4
International (NRA)	717	10.7%	1,048	15.0%	+4.3
Two or More Races	403	6.0%	542	7.8%	+1.7
Unknown / Not Reported	216	3.2%	185	2.6%	-0.6

† Source: Harvard Common Data Set, Section B2.

## C.5 YALE UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATE ENROLLMENT BY RACE/ETHNICITY (CDS SECTION B2)

**Table C.5. Yale University Undergraduate Enrollment by Race/Ethnicity (CDS Section B2)**

CATEGORY	WHITE	ASIAN	HISPANIC	BLACK	INT'L (NRA)	TWO+	UNKNOWN	TOTAL
2013-14 Count	2567	892	549	365	570	324	121	5422
2013-14 %	47.3%	16.4%	10.1%	6.7%	10.5%	6.0%	2.2%	—
2024-25 Count	2110	1483	1121	628	754	479	145	6758
2024-25 %	31.2%	21.9%	16.6%	9.3%	11.2%	7.1%	2.1%	—
Change (pp)	-16.1 PP	+5.5 PP	+6.5 pp	+2.6 PP	+0.7 PP	+1.1 PP	-0.1 pp	—

† Source: Yale Common Data Set, Section B2. “Unknown” essentially flat (2.2%→2.1%).

## C.5A YALE CHAPLAIN'S OFFICE — SELECTED RELIGIOUS CATEGORIES: 2000S–2024

**Table C.5a. Yale Religious Diversity: Selected Categories by Decade (Chaplain's Office)**

CATEGORY	2000s AVG	2010s AVG	2021	2022	2023	2024
<b>JEWISH</b>	19.9%	16.4%	9.9%	10.1%	10.2%	9.5%
Atheist	0.5%	5.2%	11.2%	10.6%	11.2%	12.0%
Agnostic	0.7%	4.6%	18.5%	18.3%	18.2%	17.5%
<b>Secular combined (Ath.+Agn.)</b>	1.2%	9.8%	29.7%	28.9%	29.4%	29.5%
Non- Denom. / Christian	0.0%	4.6%	8.3%	8.6%	8.9%	9.7%
Muslim	—	3.2%	3.6%	4.7%	4.5%	6.1%
Catholic	27.2%	26.2%	21.1%	20.5%	20.0%	19.4%
Episcopalian	6.2%	4.6%	3.2%	2.7%	2.6%	3.0%

**Source reliability ratings.** HIGH = mandatory form, full population coverage. MEDIUM-HIGH = full decade coverage, voluntary form. MEDIUM = partial decade or voluntary form. LOW ⚠ = single year or heavily skewed methodology per source's own notation.

**Endpoint cluster.** The 2021–2024 cluster average is the average of four individual cohort figures: 9.90% (2021), 10.10% (2022), 10.20% (2023), and 9.50% (2024), yielding 9.93% (rounded to 9.9%). This cluster average is provided for reference; the body report's preferred endpoint is the most recent single-class Chaplain figure: 9.5% (entering Class of 2028).

**Caveats on specific figures.** The 1970s figure (19.60%) is the single entering class of 1970, not a decade average; it cannot be used as a “peak” baseline without this caveat. The 2000s figure (19.88%) is the strongest available partial-decade baseline: 4 consecutive years with the highest documented averages in the voluntary-form era. The 2021–2024 cluster average is the average of four individual cohort figures: 9.90% (2021), 10.10% (2022), 10.20% (2023), and 9.50% (2024), yielding 9.93% (rounded to 9.9%). The body report's preferred endpoint is the most recent single-class Chaplain figure: 9.5% (entering Class of 2028).

## C.5B YALE CHAPLAIN’S OFFICE — DECADE-BY-DECADE DATA RELIABILITY

**Table C.5b. Yale Chaplain Jewish Enrollment by Decade with Reliability Ratings**

DECADE	JEWISH %	RELIABILITY	COVERAGE / NOTES
1930s	10.1%	HIGH	All years, all freshmen – mandatory form, complete population data
1940s	9.9%	HIGH	All years; mandatory form; WWII creates non-standard cohort structure (not comparable to later decades)
1950s	11.1%	MEDIUM	Partial – 6 of ~10 years; mixed freshmen / undergrad population methodology
1960s	11.4%	MEDIUM	1963–1967 only (5 years); full undergrad population, not freshmen only
1970s	19.6%	LOW ⚠️	SKEWED – class of 1970 freshmen only; 1974–79 small affiliations lumped. Single class, not a decade average.
1980s	13.1%	LOW ⚠️	SKEWED – 1980–1982 only (3 of ~10 years); same lumping issue. Not used as baseline.
1990s	15.4%	MEDIUM	Classes of 1991, 1996, 1997, 1998 only (4 of ~10 years); form now optional
2000s	19.9%	MEDIUM	Classes 2005–2008 only (4 of ~10 years); voluntary form. Used as primary baseline – highest recorded partial-decade average.
2010s	16.4%	MEDIUM-HIGH	All 11 classes present – most complete decade. First decade with full year-by-year coverage.
2021–2024	9.5–10.2%	MEDIUM	Year-by-year granularity. Avg 9.93%. No response rates provided for this period. Voluntary form throughout.

† Source: Yale University Chaplain’s Office, *Religious Diversity at Yale: accessible data*. Reliability ratings by this study. HIGH = mandatory form, full population coverage. MEDIUM-HIGH = full decade coverage, voluntary form. MEDIUM = partial decade or voluntary form. LOW ⚠️ = single year or heavily skewed methodology per source’s own notation. The 1970s figure (19.60%) is the single entering class of 1970, not a decade average, it cannot be used as a “peak” baseline without this caveat. The 2000s figure (19.88%) is the strongest available partial-decade baseline: 4 consecutive years with the highest documented averages in the voluntary-form era. The 2021–2024 cluster average (9.93%, rounded to 9.9%) is the average of four individual cohort figures: 9.90% (2021), 10.10% (2022), 10.20% (2023), and 9.50% (2024). The body report’s preferred endpoint is the most recent single-class Chaplain figure: 9.5% (entering Class of 2028).

## C.6 PRINCETON UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATE ENROLLMENT BY RACE/ETHNICITY (CDS SECTION B2)

**Table C.6. Princeton University Undergraduate Enrollment by Race/Ethnicity (CDS Section B2)**

CATEGORY	WHITE	ASIAN	HISPANIC	BLACK	INT'L (NRA)	TWO+	UNKNOWN	TOTAL
2013–14 Count	2467	1051	424	400	569	218	98	5234
2013–14 %	47.1%	20.1%	8.1%	7.6%	10.9%	4.2%	1.9%	—
2024–25 Count	1921	1339	574	499	721	411	232	5709
2024–25 %	33.6%	23.5%	10.1%	8.7%	12.6%	7.2%	4.1%	—
Change (pp)	-13.5 PP	+3.4 pp	+2.0 pp	+1.1 pp	+1.7 pp	+3.0 PP	+2.2 pp	—

† Source: Princeton Common Data Set, Section B2. “Unknown” rose notably: 1.9%→4.1%, consistent with post-SFFA opt-out behavior that deflates observed growth in named categories.

## C.7 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA UNDERGRADUATE ENROLLMENT BY RACE/ETHNICITY (CDS SECTION B2)

**Table C.7. University of Pennsylvania Undergraduate Enrollment by Race/Ethnicity (CDS Section B2)**

CATEGORY	WHITE	ASIAN	HISPANIC	BLACK	INT'L (NRA)	TWO+	UNKNOWN	TOTAL
2015–16 Count	4,255	1,959	998	688	1,127	405	281	9,726
2015–16 %	43.7%	20.1%	10.3%	7.1%	11.6%	4.2%	2.9%	—
2024–25 Count	2,583	2,964	1,163	876	1,327	537	546	10,013
2024–25 %	25.8%	29.6%	11.6%	8.7%	13.2%	5.4%	5.5%	—
Change (pp)	-18.0 PP	+9.5 PP	+1.4 pp	+1.7 pp	+1.7 pp	+1.2 PP	+2.6 pp	—

† Source: Penn Common Data Set, Section B2. Baseline 2014–15. “Unknown” rose 3.0%→5.5% (possible post-SFFA opt-out effect).

## C.8 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATE ENROLLMENT BY RACE/ETHNICITY (IPEDS)

Columbia figures use IPEDS EF all-undergraduate enrollment (CC+SEAS+General Studies combined) for both years, as no federal school-level race breakdown existed for 2013. General Studies (GS) is older, whiter, and more international than CC/SEAS; its inclusion inflates White and Int'l shares and suppresses apparent Black and Hispanic gains. Columbia trends are not directly comparable to other schools. See Table C.9 for the 2024 CC+SEAS-only breakdown.

**Table C.8. Columbia University Undergraduate Enrollment by Race/Ethnicity (IPEDS, all-UG)**

CATEGORY	WHITE	ASIAN	HISPANIC	BLACK	INT'L (NRA)	TWO+	UNKNOWN	TOTAL
2013 (Count)	3126	1362	1082	597	1090	358	300	7970
2013 (%)	39.2%	17.1%	13.6%	7.5%	13.7%	4.5%	3.8%	—
2024 (Count)	2575	1679	1381	674	1770	561	293	8973
2024 (%)	28.7%	18.7%	15.4%	7.5%	19.7%	6.3%	3.3%	—
Change (pp)	-10.5 pp	+1.6 pp	+1.8 pp	+0.0 pp	+6.0 pp	+1.8 pp	-0.5 pp	—

† Source: IPEDS EF2013A\_RV and EF2024A, UNITID 190150, degree-seeking undergraduates (CC+SEAS+GS). Black share essentially flat (7.5%→7.5%) due to GS inclusion. Int'l share grew +6.0 pp, partly driven by GS international dual-degree programs.

### C.9 COLUMBIA 2024 SCHOOL-LEVEL RACE BREAKDOWN: CC+SEAS VS. GENERAL STUDIES

Columbia’s IPEDS all-undergraduate figures (Table C.8) include General Studies, which is 35% White and 29% international, substantially different from CC and SEAS. The table below, drawn from Columbia’s 2024 OPIR data, separates the three schools. CC+SEAS White share (26.2%) is materially lower than the all-UG figure (28.7%) once GS is removed. This explains why Columbia’s apparent white decline is smaller than peers on the stacking index: GS inclusion moderates the measured change.

**Table C.9. Columbia 2024 Undergraduate Enrollment by School and Race/Ethnicity (OPIR)**

SCHOOL	WHITE	ASIAN	HISPANIC	BLACK	INT’L	TWO+	UNKNOWN	OTHER	TOTAL
CC (Columbia College)	1,431	956	818	442	754	385	127	23	4,944
SEAS (Engineering)	326	480	305	98	388	89	80	5	1,771
GS (General Studies)	1,075	320	333	168	894	122	118	6	3,036
All-UG (C.8 total)	2,832	1,756	1,456	708	2,036	596	325	34	9,743
CC+SEAS only	1,757	1,436	1,123	540	1,142	474	207	28	6,715
CC+SEAS White %	26.2%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

† Source: Columbia OPIR 2024 school-level data. CC = Columbia College; SEAS = Fu Foundation School of Engineering and Applied Science; GS = School of General Studies. GS contains 44% of all international students and 1,075 of 2,832 White students in the all-UG count. The all-UG total here (9,743) differs slightly from the C.12 IPEDS figure (8,973) due to rounding and definitional differences in OPIR vs. IPEDS counts.

### C.10 DARTMOUTH COLLEGE UNDERGRADUATE ENROLLMENT BY RACE/ETHNICITY (CDS SECTION B2)

**Table C.10. Dartmouth College Undergraduate Enrollment by Race/Ethnicity (CDS Section B2)**

SCHOOL	WHITE	ASIAN	HISPANIC	BLACK	INT’L	TWO+	UNKNOWN	TOTAL
2014–15 Count	2010	588	341	284	343	209	313	4184
2014–15 %	48.0%	14.1%	8.1%	6.8%	8.2%	5.0%	7.5%	—
2024–25 Count	1973	586	442	279	667	342	134	4474
2024–25 %	44.1%	13.1%	9.9%	6.2%	14.9%	7.6%	3.0%	—
Change (pp)	-3.9 pp	-1.0 pp	+1.8 pp	-0.6 pp	+6.7 pp	+2.6 pp	-4.5 pp	—

† Source: Dartmouth Common Data Set, Section B2. Baseline 2014–15. “Unknown” fell sharply (7.5%→3.0%), meaning observed growth in named categories is partly reclassification, not new diversity. Int’l nearly doubled (+6.7 pp), largest international growth in the nine-school dataset.

## C.11 BROWN UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATE ENROLLMENT BY RACE/ETHNICITY

**Table C.11. Brown University Undergraduate Enrollment by Race/Ethnicity (CDS Section B2)**

CATEGORY	2013-14 COUNT	2013-14 %	2024-25 COUNT	2024-25 %	CHANGE (PP)
Total Undergraduates	6,182	—	7,226	—	+1,044
White (Non-Hispanic)	2,675	43.3%	2,379	32.9%	-10.4
Asian / Asian-American	762	12.3%	1,653	22.9%	+10.6
Hispanic / Latino	670	10.8%	876	12.1%	+1.3
Black / African-American	397	6.4%	591	8.2%	+1.8
International (NRA)	721	11.7%	917	12.7%	+1.0
Two or More Races	332	5.4%	574	7.9%	+2.6
Unknown / Not Reported	595	9.6%	213	2.9%	-6.7

† Source: Brown University CDS Section B2. “Unknown” category fell 6.7 pp – inflating apparent named-category growth.

## C.12 CORNELL UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATE ENROLLMENT BY RACE/ETHNICITY

**Table C.12. Cornell University Undergraduate Enrollment by Race/Ethnicity (CDS Section B2)**

CATEGORY	2013-14 COUNT	2013-14 %	2024-25 COUNT	2024-25 %	CHANGE (PP)
Total Undergraduates	14,309	—	15,792	—	+1,483
White (Non-Hispanic)	6,107	42.7%	4,915	31.1%	-11.6
Asian / Asian-American	2,340	16.4%	4,239	26.8%	+10.5
Hispanic / Latino	1,597	11.2%	2,066	13.1%	+1.9
Black / African-American	840	5.9%	1,068	6.8%	+0.9
International (NRA)	1,344	9.4%	1,498	9.5%	+0.1
Two or More Races	618	4.3%	937	5.9%	+1.6
Unknown / Not Reported	1,415	9.9%	1,016	6.4%	-3.4

† Source: Cornell CDS Section B2, degree-seeking undergraduates. Cornell includes SUNY statutory colleges (CALs, Human Ecology, ILR, Veterinary Medicine), which receive partial SUNY funding and give preference to New York State residents, providing a Jewish enrollment pathway partially independent of holistic admissions. “Unknown” fell 3.4 pp.

### C.13 STANFORD UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATE ENROLLMENT BY RACE/ ETHNICITY (CDS SECTION B2)

**Table C.13. Stanford University Undergraduate Enrollment by Race/Ethnicity (CDS Section B2)**

CATEGORY	WHITE	ASIAN	HISPANIC	BLACK	INT'L (NRA)	TWO+	UNKNOWN	TOTAL
2013-14 Count	2584	1332	1178	440	565	753	39	6980
2013-14 %	37.0%	19.1%	16.9%	6.3%	8.1%	10.8%	0.6%	—
2024-25 Count	1737	2170	1289	560	965	724	35	7554
2024-25 %	23.0%	28.7%	17.1%	7.4%	12.8%	9.6%	0.5%	—
Change (pp)	-14.0 pp	+9.6 pp	+0.2 pp	+1.1 pp	+4.7 pp	-1.2 pp	-0.1 pp	—

† Source: Stanford Common Data Set, Section B2, degree-seeking undergraduates. Baseline 2013-14. 2024-25 figures corrected to degree-seeking (7,554) from total UG (7,904).

APPENDIX D

*What the Evidence Eliminates*

**Seven falsification mechanisms.** Seven mechanisms are commonly cited to explain declining Jewish enrollment: geographic diversification, athletic recruitment, socioeconomic targeting, Asian enrollment expansion, the double-bind classification effect, international student growth, and post-October 7 dynamics. Geographic diversification is the subject of Sections D.7–D.10, where its data appear alongside the peer comparison tables in Appendix D. The remaining six are evaluated in D.1–D.6, followed by financial aid profiles in D.11.

D.1 ATHLETIC RECRUITMENT

**Table D.1. Recruited Athlete Share: Harvard vs. Peers**

INSTITUTION	RECRUITED ATHLETE SHARE (APPROX.)	SOURCE
Harvard	~10–12% of entering class	SFFA trial exhibits; NBER WP 26316 (Arcidiacono, Kinsler, Ransom)
Brown	~13% coaching-supported; ~6% BDH poll	Best Colleges / Ivy Coach; BDH Class of 2029 poll (Sept. 2025)
Yale	~13%	Yale Daily News (2023)
Princeton	~12%	Princeton Alumni Weekly (C/O 2023)
Cornell	~14%	Cornell Institutional Research (Classes 2021–2023)

† Sources: SFFA v. Harvard trial record (2018); Harvard Crimson Freshman Survey (athlete share); peer institution Common Data Sets and institutional admissions reports. Figures are approximate.

Assessment: Athletic recruitment is broadly comparable across peer institutions, making it insufficient to explain the peer divergence. Each percentage point allocated to recruited athletes functions as a negative weight on Jewish enrollment, Jewish students are significantly underrepresented in varsity sport rosters. The Crimson C/O 2027 data show a recruited athlete share of 8.0%, down from ~12% in prior years; if sustained this would free ~75 seats per class, yet Jewish enrollment did not capture additional capacity. Constraints operate through other mechanisms.

## D.2 SOCIOECONOMIC TARGETING

### **Socioeconomic targeting as a mechanism.**

Harvard's 2004 Financial Aid Initiative significantly expanded support for low-income domestic students. American Jews are disproportionately concentrated in higher income brackets (~56% of Jewish households earn \$100,000+; Pew 2020), placing them on the disfavored side of income-based targeting. The cross-institutional financial aid comparison, however, shows this mechanism is insufficient as a standalone or primary explanation.

### **International enrollment distorts the headline rate.**

Raw IPEDS 'Any Aid' rates are distorted by international enrollment growth, which expands the SFA cohort denominator without adding domestic aid recipients. Adjusting for international share (Adjusted Rate = Raw Rate ÷ (1 - International %)), Harvard's domestic aid rate was essentially flat in the matched analytical window (83% → 87%, +4.3 pp, 2013–24); Brown's was similarly flat (76% → 76%, +0.6 pp). Harvard increased domestic aid intensity modestly and lost roughly half its Jewish enrollment; Brown held flat and gained.

**No consistent cross-school pattern.** The nine-school cross-section shows no consistent relationship: Stanford carries the highest domestic-adjusted rate in the dataset (91%) and normal Jewish outcomes; Cornell the lowest (62%) and is an outperformer. Penn increased its Pell share more than any other school in the matched window yet shows a -31% Jewish decline against Brown's +20% gain. No aid weighting scheme reconciles the full nine-school pattern. Adjusted rate calculations for all nine schools across both the long-run

(2003–24) and matched (2013–24) windows appear in the IPEDS Intl-Adjusted Aid sheet of the accompanying spreadsheet.

Nothing in this analysis should be read as an argument for reducing socioeconomic access or financial aid expansion; the report's ask is measurement and monitoring of outcomes for all protected groups, not adjustment of the initiative's aims.

## D.3 ASIAN ENROLLMENT GROWTH

Penn, Brown, and Cornell all experienced approximately 10 percentage points of Asian enrollment growth (identical exposure to the same dynamic) yet produced radically different Jewish outcomes: Penn -31%, Cornell -13%, Brown 0% to +20% (instrument-dependent). Yale shows a smaller Asian gain (+5.5 pp) yet one of the steepest Jewish declines (~50%). The predicted relationship between Asian growth and Jewish decline is absent in the data. This mechanism is not supported by cross-school comparison.

**The cultural-assimilation version.** A more sophisticated version of this argument holds that the mechanism is cultural, not merely demographic: successive generations of an established community assimilate and no longer compete with the intensity of recent immigrants whose children and grandchildren are still climbing. This framing has been advanced by serious scholars of American higher education.

**The Princeton benchmark eliminates it.** The Princeton benchmark eliminates this version as well. Asian enrollment at Princeton grew +3.5 pp over the same period (Harvard +4.7 pp),

at a comparable rate. Princeton’s Jewish enrollment was flat for 35 years. If generational assimilation were the operative mechanism, it would produce declining Jewish enrollment at Princeton as well as Harvard. It does not. The peer test eliminates this hypothesis along with the simpler displacement version.

**TABLE D.3. ASIAN ENROLLMENT GROWTH VS. JEWISH ENROLLMENT OUTCOME: ALL NINE SCHOOLS, ~2013–2024**

**Table D.3. Asian Enrollment Growth vs. Jewish Enrollment Outcome: All Nine Schools, ~2013–2024**

SCHOOL	ASIAN % ~2013	ASIAN % 2024	Δ ASIAN (PP)	ASIAN SCORE (0–10)	JEWISH REL Δ	CLASSIFICATION
Harvard	24.3%	29.1%	+4.8 pp	5.0 / 10	–40%	Confirmed anomalous
Penn	19.6%	29.6%	+10.0 pp	9.5 / 10	–56.0%	Within expected range
Yale	16.4%	21.9%	+5.5 pp	5.6 / 10	–50%	Confirmed anomalous
Columbia	17.1%	18.7%	+1.6 pp	2.2 / 10	–28.6%	Unclassifiable
Princeton	20.1%	23.5%	+3.4 pp	3.8 / 10	–20%	Within expected range
Stanford	20.5%	28.7%	+8.2 pp	8.0 / 10	–21.0%	Outperformer-consistent
Dartmouth	14.1%	13.1%	–1.0 pp	0.0 / 10	–19%	Within expected range
Cornell	18.6%	29.1%	+10.5 pp	10.0 / 10	–13%	Outperformer
Brown	18.7%	29.2%	+10.5 pp	10.0 / 10	+19.5%	Outperformer

† Asian enrollment: CDS Section B2 (Columbia: IPEDS all-UG). Asian Score normalized 0–10; 10 = maximum growth. Jewish relative change = (current % – baseline %) ÷ baseline %. Cornell and Brown both show +10.5 pp Asian growth (tied at score 10.0/10) yet produce opposite Jewish outcomes (Cornell –13%, Brown 0% to +20% (instrument-dependent)). Sorted by Jewish relative change, worst to best. Note on Penn: Penn’s Jewish relative change figure in this table (–56.0%) uses the 2013 Hillel baseline (26%); the body text cites –31% using the 2016 Brandeis CMJS baseline (16%). Both figures are accurate under their respective baselines, and both classify Penn as within the Normal range. See Table C.3 for the preferred Brandeis-baseline Penn calculation.

## D.4 THE DOUBLE BIND

Note: Unlike the other mechanisms in this appendix, the Double Bind has no cross-school quantitative falsification test. It operates through structural architecture (the way diversity monitoring systems categorize applicants) rather than through a measurable policy variable that varies across institutions. It is included as framing context, not as an independently falsifiable factor.

Jewish applicants occupy an analytically unusual position: simultaneously coded as over-represented on every standard diversity metric (White, higher-income, coastal, continuing-generation, non-athletic, domestic) while belonging to a protected shared-ancestry group experiencing large adverse outcomes. Standard diversity frameworks monitor by race, not by ancestry. The monitoring infrastructure designed to protect protected groups is structurally blind to this one: not by design, but by architecture.

## D.5 INTERNATIONAL ENROLLMENT GROWTH: ALL NINE SCHOOLS

### **International growth: cross-school pattern.**

International first-time undergraduate share at all four IPEDS time points. Penn shows the sharpest Era 1 surge (+10.3 pp, 1992–2004), reflecting a documented shift in Penn’s international recruitment strategy in that period. In the long-run 2004–2024 window,

Columbia and Brown appear to lead growth (+12.0 pp and +10.1 pp respectively); however, this comparison masks important within-period variation. In the matched 2014–2024 window (aligned to the Jewish enrollment measurement period) Harvard grew its international share faster than Brown (+4.3 pp vs. +3.3 pp).

**The peer test eliminates the mechanism.** In the matched window, Brown grew international enrollment at a comparable rate to Harvard and produced the opposite Jewish outcome (+20% gain vs. –50% decline). Dartmouth (+6.4 pp) and Stanford (+6.5 pp) both grew international enrollment faster than Harvard and sit in the normal outcome tier. Princeton is the only school where international share declined in the most recent era (2014–2024: –1.1 pp), yet Princeton sits at the outperformer benchmark.

**Table D.5. International Enrollment Growth: All Nine Schools, 1992–2024**

SCHOOL	INTL % 1992	INTL % 2004	INTL % 2014	INTL % 2024	ERA 1 Δ 1992–04	ERA 2 Δ 2004–24	JEWISH REL Δ
Harvard	5.7%	9.3%	13.0%	17.4%	+3.6 pp	+8.1 pp	-40%
Penn	0.1%	10.4%	11.2%	12.9%	+10.3 pp	+2.5 pp	-56.0%
Yale	4.7%	8.9%	12.6%	12.0%	+4.2 pp	+3.1 pp	-50%
Columbia	7.1%	8.0%	16.7%	20.0%	+0.9 pp	+12.0 pp	-28.6%*
Princeton	6.9%	10.3%	13.0%	11.9%	+3.4 pp	+1.6 pp	-20%
Stanford	3.6%	5.4%	10.1%	16.6%	+1.8 pp	+11.2 pp	-21.0%
Dartmouth	3.9%	5.7%	8.0%	14.4%	+1.8 pp	+8.7 pp	-19%
Cornell	7.4%	7.0%	8.9%	10.1%	-0.4 pp	+3.1 pp	-13%
Brown	9.6%	7.3%	14.2%	17.4%	-2.3 pp	+10.1 pp	+19.5%

† Source: IPEDS Fall Enrollment Survey (EF), first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduates from foreign countries. Era 1 = 1992–2004; Era 2 = 2004–2024 (single delta to match stacking model operationalization). \*Penn 1992 international count (2 students) reflects near-zero baseline; the +10.3 pp Era 1 spike is verified against IPEDS source data. \*\*Columbia denominator includes GS. Sorted by Jewish relative change, worst to best.

## D.6 POST-OCTOBER 7 DYNAMICS

Multiple sources document accelerated Jewish student migration toward Southern universities following October 7, 2023. Rose Horowitz’s “College-Age Jews Are Heading South” (The Atlantic, August 26, 2025) reported substantial increases at Tulane (reaching 40–44 percent Jewish enrollment), Vanderbilt, Emory, and the University of Miami. Yeshiva University reported a 53 percent increase in transfer applications for Fall 2024–2025. These post-October 7 dynamics represent a second phase of change driven by campus-climate concerns, analytically distinct from the pre-2023 policy-driven decline this report documents. The decline preceded October 7 by a decade.

## SUPPORTING DATA: GEOGRAPHIC AND FINANCIAL AID ANALYSIS

### D.7 GEOGRAPHIC SUBSTITUTION: SCALE AND LIMITS

→ State-level IPEDS detail supporting this section is in Appendix D.9 (NE+Mid-Atlantic state data) and Appendix D.10 (nine-school geographic origin summary).

American Jews are among the most geographically concentrated ancestry groups in the U.S.: ~59% live in five states (New York, California, New Jersey, Florida, Illinois) and ~80% in the top 40 metros (Gelman 2013). The Northeast and Mid-Atlantic contain approximately 48% of the U.S. Jewish population. Harvard's geographic diversification priority directly de-weights the regions where Jewish applicants are most concentrated.

Scale: Harvard OIRA and Gazette data show the Mid-Atlantic share of admitted classes falling from ~26% (2005–08) to ~21% (2020–25); roughly 83 fewer annual seats from the most Jewish-dense region. IPEDS state-level data sharpen this: New York enrollment fell from 264 students (1992) to 160 (2024). Applying the ~25% Jewish share of the New York applicant pool implies ~26 fewer Jewish students annually from this substitution alone.

Limits: Two independent tests establish geography as insufficient to explain Harvard's outcome as primary cause. (1) The Brown terminal-point test: Brown diversified 1.68× more yet arrived at the same geographic endpoint and maintained ~24% Jewish enrollment. (2) The temporal inversion: geographic rebalancing was most active when Jewish enrollment was stable, and nearly dormant during the largest phase of decline. Both tests affirmatively falsify geography as primary cause.

### D.8 ERA-BY-ERA GEOGRAPHIC DECOMPOSITION

The era-by-era decomposition for Harvard appears in Table E.3 (Appendix E, Temporal Inversion Test); the nine-school era-by-era comparison is Table F.10 (Section F.10 above). In brief: geographic rebalancing was most active in Era 1 (1992–2004, –6.3 pp) when Jewish enrollment held steady at ~25%; the largest enrollment collapse occurred in Era 2 (2004–2014, –1.5 pp geographic change); and Era 3 (2014–2024) shows continued decline despite geographic rebalancing resuming at a smaller scale. The temporal inversion (enrollment falling fastest when geographic pressure was lowest) is the central evidentiary finding of the peer comparison methodology.

## D.8 ERA-BY-ERA GEOGRAPHIC DECOMPOSITION

**Table D.8: temporal inversion.** Table D.8 presents the era-by-era decomposition for Harvard. Geographic rebalancing was most active in Era 1 (1992–2004, -6.3 pp NE+Mid-Atlantic), when Jewish enrollment held steady at approximately 25 percent. The largest enrollment collapse occurred in Era 2 (2004–2014, only -1.5 pp geographic change).

Era 3 (2014–2024) shows continued Jewish enrollment decline despite geographic rebalancing resuming at a smaller scale. The temporal inversion – enrollment falling fastest precisely when geographic pressure was lowest – constitutes a Level A falsification of geography as primary cause. The nine-school era-by-era comparison appears in Table D.10 above.

**Table D.8. Harvard Geographic Rebalancing by Era: Temporal Inversion Test**

ERA	PERIOD	NE+MID-ATL. CHANGE (PP)	HARVARD JEWISH ENROLLMENT	INTERPRETATION
Era 1	1992–2004	-6.3 pp	~25% (stable)	Rebalancing most active; Jewish enrollment unaffected – inversion
Era 2	2004–2014	-1.5 pp	~25% → ~14% (Brandeis)	Rebalancing nearly dormant; largest collapse occurred here
Era 3	2014–2024	-3.6 pp	~14% → ~7%	Continued decline; geographic shift resuming but far smaller than Era 1

† Source: IPEDS Enrollment Survey 1992–2024; Brandeis CMJS 2016. The mechanism with the least movement coincides with the largest collapse: a Level A falsification of geography as primary cause. Note: The nine-school era-by-era comparison is in Table D.10 above.

## D.9 IPEDS STATE-LEVEL GEOGRAPHIC DETAIL: NE AND MID-ATLANTIC STATES

This table provides the state-level first-time undergraduate enrollment counts underlying the geographic diversification analysis in E.2 and Appendix D.8. Figures are drawn from the IPEDS Fall Enrollment Survey. Harvard and Brown are shown as the primary comparison pair; the NE+Mid-Atlantic aggregate and class-share calculations match the era-by-era analysis in Table E.3.

**Table D.9. IPEDS First-Time UG Enrollment from NE+Mid-Atlantic States: Harvard and Brown, 1992–2024**

STATE / REGION	HARVARD 1992	HARVARD 2004	HARVARD 2014	HARVARD 2024	BROWN 1992	BROWN 2004	BROWN 2014	BROWN 2024
Connecticut	45	43	44	33	64	74	54	58
Maine	9	11	6	5	12	13	13	7
Massachusetts	233	208	234	237	169	167	158	130
New Hampshire	11	9	5	8	17	14	8	5
Rhode Island	12	7	14	6	42	71	67	55
Vermont	7	6	8	2	7	13	7	6
Delaware	5	4	2	4	5	2	2	4
Maryland	46	40	39	40	50	41	47	58
New Jersey	96	100	74	86	104	93	80	82
New York	264	221	207	160	262	189	195	200
Pennsylvania	55	55	49	40	68	55	48	55
Washington DC	16	8	10	8	23	9	8	5
NE+Mid-Atl TOTAL (count)	799	712	692	629	823	741	687	665
NE+Mid-Atl % of class	49.7%	43.4%	41.9%	38.3%	57.9%	51.9%	44.1%	38.7%

† Source: IPEDS Fall Enrollment Survey (EF), State of Residence. NE = CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT; Mid-Atlantic = DE, MD, NJ, NY, PA, DC. “Total class” denominator = IPEDS total first-time degree-seeking UGs (includes international). Percentages match the IPEDS NE+Mid-Atlantic share figures used in the stacking index and E.2 terminal-point analysis. Harvard New York fell from 264 (1992) to 160 (2024); Brown New York held roughly flat (262→200).

## D.10 GEOGRAPHIC ORIGIN: NE+MID-ATLANTIC SHARE, ALL NINE SCHOOLS

**Geographic shift: era-by-era breakdown.** NE+Mid-Atlantic share of first-time undergraduates at all four IPEDS time points. NE = CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT; Mid-Atlantic = DE, MD, NJ, NY, PA, DC. Each era delta is shown separately to capture inflection points: Era 1 (1992–2004) captures the pre-diversification baseline; Era 2 (2004–2014) the acceleration phase; Era 3 (2014–2024) the post-SFFA era.

**Geography does not predict Jewish outcome.** Brown shows the steepest total geographic diversification (–19.2 pp), 1.68× Harvard’s –11.4 pp, yet is the only school with positive Jewish enrollment growth. Cornell shows the anomalous Era 1 surge (+4.0 pp) driven by its statutory college enrollment, then reverts.

**Table D.10. NE+Mid-Atlantic Share of First-Time Undergraduates by Era: All Nine Schools, 1992–2024**

SCHOOL	NE+MA 1992	NE+MA 2004	NE+MA 2014	NE+MA 2024	ERA 1 Δ 1992–04	ERA 2 Δ 2004–14	ERA 3 Δ 2014–24	JEWISH REL Δ
Harvard	49.7%	43.4%	41.9%	38.3%	-6.3 pp	-1.5 pp	-3.6 pp	-40%
Penn	65.8%	52.4%	49.6%	46.8%	-13.4 pp	-2.8 pp	-2.8 pp	-56.0%
Yale	50.3%	41.6%	37.1%	36.7%	-8.7 pp	-4.5 pp	-0.4 pp	-50%
Columbia	58.9%	57.3%	41.4%	34.7%	-1.6 pp	-15.9 pp	-6.7 pp	-28.6%*
Princeton	49.6%	45.4%	42.6%	44.8%	-4.2 pp	-2.8 pp	+2.2 pp	-20%
Stanford	15.2%	15.1%	14.4%	11.5%	-0.1 pp	-0.7 pp	-2.9 pp	-21.0%
Dartmouth	58.0%	50.8%	43.1%	37.2%	-7.2 pp	-7.7 pp	-5.9 pp	-19%
Cornell	61.6%	65.6%	56.6%	56.0%	+4.0 pp	-9.0 pp	-0.6 pp	-13%
Brown	57.9%	51.9%	44.1%	38.7%	-6.0 pp	-7.8 pp	-5.4 pp	+19.5%

† Source: IPEDS Fall Enrollment Survey (EF), state of residence, first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduates. Denominators from IPEDS International Enrollment sheet (total first-time UGs including international). Era 1 = 1992–2004; Era 2 = 2004–2014; Era 3 = 2014–2024. Stanford NE+MA share structurally low (West Coast draw). Cornell Era 1 anomaly reflects statutory college surge before reversion. \*Columbia denominator includes General Studies. State-level detail for all 9 schools available in IPEDS Geography source data. Sorted by Jewish relative change, worst to best.

## D.11 FINANCIAL AID PROFILE: ALL NINE SCHOOLS

**Financial aid table: what it shows.** The table below presents IPEDS SFA any-aid rate across three snapshots for all nine schools, plus the domestic-adjusted financial aid expansion delta used in the 4-factor composite stacking model. The domestic-adjusted delta corrects the raw change for international enrollment growth: since international students are generally ineligible for institutional aid, growth in international enrollment mechanically suppresses the headline aid rate even when domestic aid policy is unchanged or expanding.

**Harvard and Brown: matched window comparison.** Harvard and Brown: matched window comparison. Harvard: raw rate flat

(72%→72%), domestic-adjusted +4.4 pp. Brown: raw -2 pp, adjusted +0.7 pp. Pattern is consistent; Table D.11 below presents the full domestic-adjusted series for all nine schools.

**Cornell caveat.** Cornell's IPEDS aid rate declined ~10 pp (2003–2024), similar to Harvard's trajectory. However, Cornell's statutory college structure provides an independent structural pathway to Jewish enrollment that is partially independent of holistic admissions decisions. The aggregate pattern, Harvard and Yale showing steep aid rate declines paired with anomalous Jewish outcomes, therefore cannot reach Level A confidence with Cornell included. The finding holds as Level B.

**Table D.11. Financial Aid Profile and Domestic-Adjusted Expansion: All Nine Schools**

SCHOOL	AID RATE 2003	AID RATE 2014	AID RATE 2024	RAW Δ 2003–24	DOM. ADJ. Δ 2013–24	JEWISH REL Δ	BROWN 2014	BROWN 2024
Harvard	84%	72%	72%	-12 pp	+4.4 pp	-40%	54	58
Penn	57%	61%	63%	+6 pp	+3.3 pp	-56.0%	13	7
Yale	70%	59%	59%	-11 pp	-0.9 pp	-50%	158	130
Columbia	59%	53%	57%	-2 pp	+7.8 pp	-28.6%*	8	5
Princeton	52%	62%	68%	+16 pp	+6.1 pp	-20%	67	55
Stanford	76%	68%	76%	0 pp	+15.4 pp	-21.0%	7	6
Dartmouth	61%	61%	60%	-1 pp	+3.3 pp	-19%	2	4
Cornell	66%	60%	56%	-10 pp	-3.6 pp	-13%	47	58
Brown	60%	65%	63%	+3 pp	+0.7 pp	+19.5%	80	82

† Aid Rate = IPEDS SFA any-aid rate, full-time first-time degree-seeking UG cohort. Snapshots: AY 2003–04, 2013–14, 2023–24. Raw Δ is reported for descriptive context only and is not an input to the stacking model; the stacking model uses Dom. Adj. Δ 2013–24. Dom. Adj. Δ = Δ domestic aid rate (recipients ÷ (SFA cohort - IPEDS EF international first-time UGs)), 2013–14 to 2023–24 approx. \*Columbia Jewish figure unclassifiable due to GS denominator issue. Sorted by Jewish relative change, worst to best.

APPENDIX E

*The White Decomposition —  
Sensitivity and Benchmarks*

Three-scenario sensitivity analyses for Harvard and Yale, Princeton as the stability/  
outperformer benchmark, four-tier taxonomy of Jewish enrollment outcomes, and distribution  
symmetry analysis. E.1–E.2 Harvard and Yale sensitivities. E.3 Princeton benchmark. E.4–E.5  
Four-Tier taxonomy and distribution symmetry.

## E.1 HARVARD WHITE DECOMPOSITION: THREE-SCENARIO SENSITIVITY

→ The preferred single-scenario White Decomposition (all nine schools) is in Appendix C.3. For Yale's sensitivity analysis, see Appendix E.2 immediately below.

The Jewish/White Non-Jewish decomposition ratio at Harvard is highly sensitive to baseline choice. Three independent baselines produce ratios ranging from 1.4× to N/A (White Non-Jewish share actually increased under inflated Hillel baseline). All three show Jews declining faster than White Non-Jewish; the magnitude differs substantially. The preferred Brandeis baseline (2.33×) represents the most defensible estimate.

**Table E.1. Harvard White Decomposition: Three Baselines**

SCENARIO	W-JEW BASE	WNJ BASE	$\Delta$ W-JEWISH	$\Delta$ WNJ	RATIO	ASSESSMENT
Upper Bound: Hillel 25%	22.5%	22.3%	-71.6%	+5.5%	N/A†	† White Non-Jewish INCREASED; artifact of inflated Hillel baseline. Reported for sensitivity analysis only.
<b>Preferred: Brandeis 14% ★</b>	12.6%	29.9%	-49.2%	-21.2%	<b>2.33×</b>	PREFERRED. Brandeis SSRI random sample. Jewish enrollment declined 2.33× faster than White non-Jewish enrollment.
ALT: Crimson 9.5% base	8.6%	36.3%	-43.2%	-30.9%	<b>1.4×</b>	Crimson = freshmen + religion-only. Likely understates Jewish base (excludes secular).

† CDS White base = 44.81%; current = 29.92%. White Jewish = Jewish% × 0.90 (Pew). White non Jewish = White Total – White Jewish. All three scenarios show Jews declining faster than White non Jewish; the Upper Bound row produces an undefined ratio because White non Jewish share actually increased under the inflated 25% Hillel baseline: this scenario generated the “virtually all White decline was Jewish” claim; it does not hold under the preferred Brandeis baseline. The Preferred row (2.33×) is the recommended estimate; the ALT row (1.4×) provides a lower-bound corroboration using a consistent instrument. Note: the body text cites the lower bound as 1.5×; this figure uses Crimson White self-identification minus Crimson Jewish as the WNJ denominator (43.2% Jewish relative decline ÷ 28.9% WNJ relative decline = 1.49× ≈ 1.5×), while the ALT row here uses the CDS White share as the denominator, producing 1.4×. Both are valid lower-bound estimates; the difference reflects denominator choice. Alternative Upper Bound calculation (body text, Figure 10 paragraph): using De Silva 1992 Harvard Crimson White base (63.5%) with no Pew adjustment: WNJ base = 63.5% – 25.0% = 38.5%; WNJ current = 29.92% – 7.1% = 22.82%; WNJ relative decline = -40.7%; Jewish relative decline = -71.6%; J/WNJ = 1.76×. Note: the Pew ×0.90 adjustment does not cancel across endpoints when the Jewish share changes (25% baseline vs. 7.1% current): the Pew factor removes a larger absolute amount from the baseline White pool than from the current White pool, slightly enlarging the WNJ baseline relative to the WNJ current. Applying Pew ×0.90 symmetrically to both endpoints produces J/WNJ = 1.68×. The body text uses the no-Pew version (1.76×) as the upper-bound long-run ratio; readers wishing to apply the Pew adjustment consistently should use 1.68×. Under either version, the long-run ratio is within the ANOMALOUS tier and consistent with the preferred Brandeis estimate (2.33×).

## E.2 YALE WHITE DECOMPOSITION: THREE-SCENARIO SENSITIVITY

Yale’s decomposition is uniquely sensitive to instrument selection. A cross-methodology comparison, pairing the Chaplain’s Office baseline (religion-only, 16.4%) with Hillel’s current figure (inclusive, 12%), produces a ratio of 0.75× that understates Jewish decline. Using a consistent instrument (Chaplain→Chaplain, 16.4% → 9.5%) yields 1.39×, Jews declined approximately 40% faster than White non Jewish. Yale is anomalous, second only to Harvard.

**Table E.2. Yale White Decomposition: Three Scenarios**

SCENARIO	$\Delta$ W-JEWISH	$\Delta$ W-NON-JEWISH	RATIO	ASSESSMENT
Upper Bound: Hillel 27% → Hillel 12%	-55.6%	-11.4%	4.9×	Upper bound scenario. Hillel 27% baseline is pre-2018 and likely inflated. Inclusive→inclusive instrument pairing is consistent, but the starting point is overstated.
Cross-Method: Chaplain 16.4% → Hillel 12% □	-26.8%	-37.3%	0.72×	⚠️ CROSS-METHODOLOGY: religion-only base paired with inclusive current. Understates Jewish decline because the Chaplain baseline excludes secular Jews whom Hillel counts. Reported for sensitivity analysis; not recommended for analytical conclusions.
<b>Preferred:</b> <b>Chaplain 16.4%</b> <b>→ 9.5% ★</b>	-42.1%	-30.4%	1.39×	★ PREFERRED. Same instrument both ends (Chaplain religion-only). Jews declined ~40% faster than White Non-Jewish. Yale is ANOMALOUS – second only to Harvard.

† CDS White base = 47.34% (2013–14); current = 31.22% (2024–25). Chaplain C/O 2028 (entering Fall 2024) = 9.5% is the most recent consistent-instrument endpoint available. YDN Class of 2022 survey reported 10.0% (54.75% RR, n=864), corroborating the Chaplain level. The consistent-instrument ratio (1.39×) places Yale firmly in the anomalous tier with Harvard (2.33×), not in the proportional tier with Princeton (0.11×).

### E.3 PRINCETON AS STABILITY/OUTPERFORMER BENCHMARK

**Princeton as the analytical baseline.** Princeton provides the analytical baseline against which Harvard and Yale anomalies are measured. Using CIRP via Hargadon (PAW, Feb 2006) (10.5%, 1988–2003 avg) as baseline and DP Senior Survey 3-yr average (9.87%: Senior 2022 11.8%, Senior 2023 8.3%, Senior 2024 9.5% ★) as endpoint, Princeton shows a modest 0.63 percentage point decline over 20+ years. The white decomposition ratio is 0.11×: Jews declined at roughly one-tenth the rate of White non-Jewish peers. This is exactly what normal diversification looks like.

**The 21.2× gap.** Princeton’s stability makes the Harvard (2.33×) and Yale (1.39×) ratios more analytically significant, not less. The divergence between Princeton’s 0.11× and Harvard’s 2.33× represents a 21.2× gap in how Jewish students fared relative to White non Jewish at two Ivy League schools over the same period. Full Princeton source inventory and three-phase narrative are in the companion analytical workbook.

**Table E.3.1. Daily Princetonian Senior Survey: Jewish Religious Self-Identification, Graduating Classes 2022–2025**

GRADUATING CLASS	SURVEY YEAR	JEWISH %	N (RELIGION)	TOTAL RESP.	CLASS SIZE	RESP. RATE	QUESTION / NOTES
Class of 2022	Spring 2022	11.8%	490	516	1,247	41.4%	Check all that apply
Class of 2023	Spring 2023	8.3%	542	571	1,296	44.1%	Check all that apply
Class of 2024 ★ <b>PREFERRED</b>	Spring 2024	9.5%	506	539	1,310	41.1%	Check all that apply. 9.5% (most recent comparable single wave)
Class of 2025 ⚠	Spring 2025	12.3%	481	501	1,308	38.3%	⚠ SINGLE-SELECT – NOT COMPARABLE. Do not use as endpoint.

Operative endpoint for cross-institutional comparison is 9.87% (three-wave average, Classes of 2022–2024). Class of 2025 excluded: single-select format introduced in that survey year breaks instrument comparability with earlier cohorts.

**Table E.3.2. Daily Princetonian Frosh Survey 2025: Jewish Religious Self-Identification, Incoming Class of 2029**

SURVEY	YEAR	JEWISH %	N	TOTAL RESP.	RESP. RATE	NOTES
DP Frosh Survey 2025	Summer 2025	9.4%	741	~741	59.6%	Check all that apply. Entering class: Class of 2029. Incoming class (9.4%) ≈ graduating class (9.5%, Senior 2024). Princeton enrollment STABLE.

JEWISH UNDERGRADUATE ENROLLMENT AT HARVARD AND ITS PEERS

**Table E.3.3. Princeton University Jewish Enrollment: All Available Sources, 1920s–2025**

YEAR/ PERIOD	% LOW	% HIGH/ POINT	HEADCOUNT	SOURCE	METHOD	NOTES
1920s	—	~3%	—	PAW historical timeline	Historical	Informal quota era, Dean Heermance
1956	—	~8%	—	Rabbi Daniel Greer memoir (NJ Jewish News 2013)	Memoir	
1961	—	~15%	—	Oren (1985)	Academic	
1967	13%	20%	—	JTA / NYT survey	News	Range reported
Early 1980s (peak)	16%	18%	—	NYT 1999; Tablet; Wikipedia	Secondary	Widely cited peak
1988–2003 avg ★	9%	13%	—	CIRP via Hargadon (PAW, Feb 2006)	CIRP Freshman Survey	10.5% avg. ★ PREFERRED BASELINE for J/WNJ
1999	—	12.0%	550	Hillel 14th ed. print, p. 22	Campus personnel estimate	Consistent with Hargadon CIRP range (9–13%). UG figure given separately from GR. Directional anchor only.
~1999	—	~10%	—	NYT ‘The Princeton Puzzle’	News report	
~2013 (Hillel)	—	~13%	~680	Hillel College Guide; NJ Jewish News Feb 2013	Hillel estimate	Most-cited baseline. Overcounts 30–65% vs. random-sample surveys.
Class of 2022 (DP)	—	11.8%	—	DP Senior Survey 2022	Opt-in	n=490; class 1247; RR 41.4%
Class of 2023 (DP)	—	8.3%	—	DP Senior Survey 2023	Opt-in	n=542; class 1296; RR 44.1%
2023 (Hillel)	—	9.6%	~500	Hillel via Inside Higher Ed May 2023	Hillel estimate	
Class of 2024 (DP) ★	—	9.5%	—	DP Senior Survey 2024	Opt-in	n=506; class 1310; RR 41.1%. ★ PREFERRED ENDPOINT
2024 (Hillel)	—	8.6%	~450	Hillel (current website)	Hillel estimate	
Class of 2025 (DP) ⚠	—	12.3%	—	DP Senior Survey 2025	Opt-in	⚠ SINGLE-SELECT — NOT COMPARABLE
Class of 2029 (Frosh 2025)	—	9.4%	~741	DP Frosh Survey 2025	Multi-select	RR 59.6%. Confirms stability.

## E.4 FOUR-TIER TAXONOMY OF JEWISH ENROLLMENT OUTCOMES

The corrected white decomposition ratios yield a four-tier taxonomy of nine-school Jewish enrollment outcomes. The taxonomy is monotonic: schools where Jews declined faster than White non Jewish are the same schools showing the largest absolute Jewish declines. Princeton anchors the “normal” tier; Harvard and Yale are the anomalies. Note on rounding: J/WNJ ratios in the body report are rounded to one decimal place for readability; precise figures are used throughout this appendix.

**Table E.4. Four-Tier Taxonomy of Jewish Enrollment Outcomes**

TIER	SCHOOLS (RATIO)	RANGE	PATTERN	ANALYTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
<b>ANOMALOUS</b>	Harvard (2.33×), Yale (1.39×)	>1.3×	H/Y robust on preferred baselines	H/Y robust on preferred baselines.
<b>PROPORTIONAL</b>	Columbia (1.15×)	~1.0×	Near-parallel	GS denominator caveat; one school only
<b>NORMAL</b>	Princeton (0.11×), Penn (0.68×), Stanford (0.48×)	≤0.7×	Jews < WNJ	Princeton = benchmark (consistent instrument both ends). This is what normal Ivy diversification looks like.
<b>OUTPERFORMER</b>	Cornell (0.32×), Brown (N/C, inverted)	<0.4×	Jews stable/grew	Jewish enrollment substantially more stable than White Non-Jewish. Brown = strongest outperformer in dataset.

**Dartmouth: low-confidence flag.** Dartmouth’s 3.55× ratio is the highest in the dataset but rests on Hillel-only data with no independent corroboration and small absolute numbers (~490 Jewish students at baseline). It is excluded from the anomalous tier classification on mathematical grounds: its ratio is an artifact of a near-zero White non-Jewish decline denominator, not a signal of disproportionate Jewish treatment. Harvard and Yale are the only schools where the anomalous classification is robust on preferred, independently-corroborated baselines.

The gap between the normal tier (Princeton 0.11×) and the anomalous tier (Harvard 2.33×) is a 21.2× divergence in how Jewish students fared relative to White non Jewish students: the central analytical finding of the white decomposition.

The stacking composite scores in Appendix F confirm that Yale and Harvard form a distinct cluster not explained by quantifiable structural factors.

## E.5 DISTRIBUTION SYMMETRY: OVERPERFORMERS AS MIRROR IMAGE OF ANOMALIES

The four-tier taxonomy in E.4 identifies Harvard and Yale as negative anomalies, schools where Jews fared disproportionately worse than White non Jews. But the opposite tail is equally important. Cornell and Brown are positive anomalies where Jewish enrollment proved far more resilient than White non Jewish enrollment. The distribution is roughly symmetric around Princeton, and the spread in both directions is unexplained by the magnitude of diversification pressure.

**Table E.5. Distance from Princeton Benchmark (0.11×)**

SCHOOL	J/WNJ	DISTANCE ABOVE BENCHMARK	TIER	NOTES
Harvard	2.33×	21.2× above	ANOMALOUS	Jews declined 2.33× faster than White non-Jews
Yale	1.39×	12.6× above	ANOMALOUS	Consistent-instrument series (Chaplain's Office)
Columbia	1.15×	10.5× above	PROPORTIONAL	Hillel instrument; medium confidence
Penn	0.68×	6.2× above	NORMAL	Brandeis CMJS 2016 baseline; high confidence
Stanford	0.48×	4.4× above	NORMAL	Hillel instrument; medium confidence
Cornell	0.32×	2.9× above	OUTPERFORMER	Jews declined at 0.32× the rate of White non-Jews
Brown	N/CN/C (inverted)	N/C (INVERTED) N/C (inverted)	OUTPERFORMER	Jewish enrollment grew 0% to +20% (instrument-dependent); J/WNJ not calculable.
Princeton	0.11×	BENCHMARK	OUTPERFORMER (BENCHMARK)	35-year consistent-instrument series (CIRP → DP Senior Survey). Most extensively documented peer school; best-controlled reference point.

† Dartmouth (3.55×) omitted from this table because its position is driven by its unusually small White decline (-3.9 pp), which amplifies the ratio arithmetically. See Table C.3 for full listing. Sorted by ratio descending. Red = anomalous negative; blue = normal/benchmark; green = outperformer.

## MIRROR-IMAGE PAIRS

The most analytically significant finding is not any single school's ratio but the existence of mirror-image pairs, schools with comparable structural profiles producing opposite Jewish outcomes:

Harvard (2.33×) ↔ Brown (N/C, INVERTED): The extreme outliers in opposite directions. Both have near-identical composite stacking scores (Harvard 0.584, Brown 0.508 on the 4-factor composite model). Both underwent substantial White decline (-14.9 pp vs. -10.4 pp). Both are Ivy League schools with holistic admissions. Yet Harvard's Jewish students declined 49% (Brandeis preferred) while Brown's grew 20%. No quantifiable stacking factor distinguishes them.

Yale (1.39×) ↔ Cornell (0.32×): Similar White decline magnitude (-16.1 pp vs. -11.6 pp) but a 4.3× gap in how Jewish students fared relative to White non Jews. At Yale, Jews declined 42% faster than White non Jews; at Cornell, Jews were 70% more stable. Cornell's statutory college structure provides one partial explanation (independent enrollment pathway), but the magnitude of the divergence exceeds what that structural difference alone predicts.

Penn as an instructive comparison: Penn experienced the largest White decline in the entire nine-school dataset (-18.0 pp) yet sits squarely at the Princeton benchmark (0.68×). This is the single strongest piece of evidence that White enrollment decline magnitude does not determine the Jewish/White non Jewish treatment ratio. The school that diversified the most occupies the Normal tier.

## WHAT THE SYMMETRIC DISTRIBUTION ESTABLISHES

Princeton is not merely a convenient benchmark. It is the center of a real distribution. Both tails are anomalous: the negative tail (Harvard, Yale) and the positive tail (Cornell, Brown) are equally distant from the center and equally unexplained by aggregate structural factors. The stacking hypothesis fails symmetrically: it cannot explain why Brown outperformed or why Harvard underperformed. The residual (whatever distinguishes Harvard/Yale from Cornell/Brown) operates in both directions and is not captured by the quantifiable stacking factors in Appendix F.

## APPENDIX F

*The Stacking Model*

Source for all stacking composite scores cited in the body of the report.

**F.1 OVERVIEW**

→ **The underlying Jewish enrollment figures used to calculate J/WNJ outcomes in this appendix are in Appendix C.1–C.3. The four-tier outcome taxonomy that classifies each school is in Appendix E.4.**

The stacking framework is the strongest structural argument for why some Jewish enrollment decline was expected at elite universities undergoing significant demographic change. This report accepts the framework in full, and then shows, with the same data and the same methodology, that it cannot explain what actually happened at Harvard and Yale. The gap between what the stacking model predicts and what the data show is the subject of everything that follows.

**Composite stacking score: what it measures.**

The composite stacking score quantifies total structural pressure on Jewish enrollment at each university. It combines four dimensions — international enrollment growth, Northeast corridor enrollment shift, White enrollment decline, and financial aid expansion — using the OECD/JRC Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators (2008) methodology: min-max normalization within the peer group, 50/50 level-to-movement weighting within each dimension, and equal dimension weighting across the four.

The result is a single score between 0 and 1, where 1 represents maximum stacking pressure relative to this nine-school group (not an absolute external standard). The analysis does not establish causation; it tests whether aggregate stacking exposure explains the cross-school pattern.

**Note on instrument methodology. This appendix uses cross-school Hillel-to-Hillel enrollment figures for comparability across all nine schools when computing baseline Jewish enrollment percentages and relative declines, with the exception of Princeton, whose preferred CIRP → DP Senior Survey figures are shown in Table E.3.3. Penn’s Jewish relative decline in this appendix (–56%) reflects the Hillel 2013 baseline (26%); the body text uses the Brandeis 2016 baseline (16%), producing –31%. Both figures are correct under their respective instruments. Do not compare the –56% (Hillel-to-Hillel) figure to the –31% (Brandeis-based) figure cited in the body text.**

The J/WNJ ratios reported in the body of the report use consistent-instrument pairings at each school (same survey type at both endpoints), which produces more precise individual-school ratios but precludes direct cross-school comparison. Princeton’s preferred J/WNJ calculation uses CIRP (1988–2003 avg) → DP Senior Survey 3-year average (9.87%), which is more precise than the Hillel-to-Hillel decline of 13% → 8.6% (documented in Appendix E.3).

## F.2 COMPOSITE STACKING SCORES

Table F.2.1 presents the primary output: each school's composite stacking score, Jewish enrollment change, J/WNJ ratio, and tier classification. Schools are sorted by composite score (highest structural pressure first). Table F.2.2 presents the dimensional breakdown, showing each school's normalized score on all four dimensions and the composite.

**Tier definitions.** ANOMALOUS = J/WNJ ratio above 1.3× (Jews declined substantially faster than White non-Jews). PROPORTIONAL = J/WNJ ratio between 0.7× and 1.3×. NORMAL = J/WNJ ratio between 0.35× and 0.70× (Jews declined more slowly than White non-Jews). OUTPERFORMER = J/WNJ ratio below 0.35× (Jews declined at less than one-third the rate of White non-Jews), or Jewish enrollment grew in absolute terms.

### **The three confirmed outperformers.**

Princeton (J/WNJ = 0.11×; Jews -6%, WNJ -56%), Cornell (J/WNJ = 0.32×; Jews -13%, WNJ -41%), and Brown (absolute growth of +19.5%; J/WNJ inverted) are the three confirmed outperformers in this dataset. Princeton is designated as the benchmark: the most extensively documented school in the peer group, with a 35-year consistent-instrument series, whose better-than-proportional outcome establishes the most conservative available reference point for the Harvard and Yale anomalies.

**Table F.2.1. Nine-School Composite Stacking Scores and Jewish Enrollment Outcomes**

SCHOOL	COMPOSITE SCORE	J% BASELINE	BASELINE SOURCE/YEAR	J% CURRENT (2024-25)	RELATIVE J DECLINE	J/WNJ RATIO	TIER
<b>Stanford</b>	0.682	10.0%	2013-14 Hillel	7.9%	-21%	0.48×	NORMAL
<b>Columbia</b>	0.625	22.0%	2013 Hillel	15.7%	-29%	1.15×	PROPORTIONAL
<b>Harvard</b>	0.584	14.0%	2015-16 Brandeis	7.1%	-49%	2.33×	ANOMALOUS
<b>Brown</b>	0.508	20.0%	2013-14 Hillel	23.9%	+19.5%†	N/C‡N/C (inverted)‡	OUTPERFORMER
<b>Penn</b>	0.494	26.0%	2013-16 Hillel	11.0%	-58%§	0.68×	NORMAL
<b>Dartmouth</b>	0.383	11.0%	2014-15 Hillel	8.9%	-19%	3.55×†	ANOMALOUS†
<b>Princeton</b>	0.381	10.5%	CIRP 1988-2003	9.87%	-6%	0.11×	OUTPERFORMER (BENCHMARK)
<b>Yale</b>	0.344	16.4%	Chaplain 2010s	9.5%	-42%	1.39×	ANOMALOUS
<b>Cornell</b>	0.322	23.0%	2013-14 Hillel	20.0%	-13%	0.32×	OUTPERFORMER

§ **Penn.** The -58% figure uses the Hillel 2013-16 baseline (26.0%), consistent with the cross-school comparability standard applied throughout this table. The body text's -31% figure uses the Brandeis CMJS 2016 baseline (~16%), Penn's preferred instrument. Both figures are directionally consistent (decline confirmed); the difference reflects baseline instrument choice. Penn's Hillel 2013-16 figures preceded Hillel's October 2017 downward revision of Penn from ~26% to ~18%.

† **Harvard.** Preferred baseline is Brandeis CMJS/SSRI 2015-16 (random sample, n>1,000, 44.7% RR); Crimson lower-bound baseline produces -40% relative decline and J/WNJ 1.5×. Both bounds are ANOMALOUS.

† **Brown.** Hillel-to-Hillel shows +19.5% Jewish gain while White non-Jewish enrollment declined; Jewish enrollment grew and White Non-Jewish enrollment fell, making Brown a confirmed OUTPERFORMER. ‡ Brown J/WNJ: the ratio is not calculable because no consistent-instrument baseline-to-current pairing exists for Brown (Hillel-inclusive at both endpoints produces an inverted result; BDH poll is current-only with no matched baseline). Brown is classified as OUTPERFORMER on directional evidence alone.

† **Dartmouth.** Ratio (3.55×) is a mathematical artifact driven by an unusually small White non-Jewish decline (-3.9 pp), which amplifies the J/WNJ ratio arithmetically. Dartmouth is treated as unclassifiable rather than anomalous.

† **Princeton.** Preferred J/WNJ uses CIRP 1988-2003 average (10.5%) → DP Senior Survey 3-year average (9.87%); J% decline = -6.0%, W-Non-Jewish decline = -55.8%, J/WNJ = 0.11×. Classified as OUTPERFORMER: J/WNJ of 0.11× is below the 0.35× threshold (Jews declined at 11% of the rate of White non-Jews). Princeton is also the benchmark school: its better-than-proportional outcome under similar structural pressure establishes the reference point for the Harvard and Yale anomalies. Hillel-to-Hillel decline (13%→8.6%) is shown above for cross-school comparability only.

**Table F.2.2. Four-Factor Composite Stacking Scores: All Nine Schools (Ranked by Composite)**

SCHOOL	D1: INTL GROWTH	D2: NE CORRIDOR	D3: WHITE DECLINE	D4: FINANCIAL AID	COMPOSITE SCORE	RANK	RANK STABLE ACROSS WEIGHTING VARIANTS?
Stanford	0.737	0.059	0.931	1.000	0.682	#1	YES
Columbia	0.656	0.792	0.561	0.493	0.625	#2	YES
Harvard	0.603	0.421	0.673	0.640	0.584	#3	YES
Brown	0.550	0.570	0.549	0.364	0.508	#4	YES
Penn	0.276	0.381	0.934	0.383	0.494	#5	YES
Dartmouth	0.718	0.462	0.000	0.354	0.383	#6	NO*
Princeton	0.095	0.336	0.567	0.528	0.381	#7	YES
Yale	0.120	0.349	0.729	0.179	0.344	#8	YES
Cornell	0.120	0.512	0.656	0.000	0.322	#9	YES

**Normalization methodology.** Normalized scores: 0 = least structural pressure in peer group; 1 = most. Each dimension uses 50/50 level-to-movement weighting (level = absolute position; movement = relative change from 2014 to 2024). Equal weighting across all four dimensions. Methodology: OECD/JRC Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators (2008), Chapter 5 (normalization) and Chapter 6 (weighting). \* Dartmouth rank stability: under 70/30 level-to-movement weighting, Dartmouth falls to #9 due to its near-zero D3 (White decline) score. Rank instability is driven by sensitivity to the White decline dimension, not measurement error.

**Dimension definitions.** D1 (International Growth): composite of current international share and relative increase. D2 (NE Corridor): composite of current NE corridor domestic share and relative change. D3 (White Decline): composite of current White domestic share and relative decline. D4 (Financial Aid Expansion): composite of current domestic-adjusted aid rate and relative increase, using IPEDS SFA domestic-adjusted figures. All baselines: Fall 2014; current: Fall 2024 (Aid: AY 2023–24).

### F.3 CORE FINDING: COMPOSITE SCORE DOES NOT PREDICT OUTCOME

→ For the Princeton benchmark that anchors the falsification argument in this section, see Appendix E.3. For the full outcome taxonomy and distribution symmetry analysis, see Appendix E.4–E.5.

**The model fails its core test.** The composite stacking model fails at four independent levels of severity. The primary failure is directional: the model predicts the wrong school. Yale's composite score (0.344) is lower than Princeton's (0.381), meaning the model formally registers Yale as under less structural pressure than Princeton. Yale's J/WNJ ratio (1.39×) is 12.6 times worse than Princeton's (0.11×). Less pressure; catastrophically worse outcome. Both endpoints rest on independent survey instruments: the Yale Chaplain series and the Princeton CIRP/Hargadon and Daily Princetonian series. A structural model that predicts the wrong winner between its two most consequential schools cannot be the primary explanation for the observed distribution. A second failure confirms the directional inversion from the opposite angle: Penn's composite score (0.494) is substantially higher than Yale's (0.344), meaning the model registers Penn as facing greater structural pressure. Penn's J/WNJ ratio is 0.68×, a Normal outcome; Yale's is 1.39×, Anomalous. The school under more structural pressure produced a better outcome. Penn's Jewish enrollment is grounded in Brandeis CMJS independent survey data. Neither the Yale-Princeton nor the Penn-Yale pair depends on Hillel data at either endpoint. A third failure operates on magnitude. Harvard's composite (0.584) sits 0.2 points above Princeton's (0.381). This gap

should translate into a proportionally larger Harvard decline. Harvard's J/WNJ ratio (1.5 to 2.3×, depending on baseline) is indeed worse than Princeton's (0.11×), but by a factor of 13 to 21. A 0.2-point composite gap in a normalized linear model does not generate a 13-fold outcome gap. A fourth failure involves the model's top prediction: Stanford holds the highest composite score in the dataset (0.682) yet produces a J/WNJ ratio of 0.48×, a normal outcome. The institution the model most confidently identifies as facing the greatest structural pressure produces a normal result. Penn, with the largest White enrollment decline in the dataset (18.0 pp), sits at the normal tier. The composite score is not doing useful predictive work at any point in its distribution.

Table F.3 presents four pairwise comparisons drawn from the distribution. The Yale-Princeton pair is the primary directional falsification: Yale has a lower composite score (0.344) than Princeton (0.381), meaning the model registers Yale as under less structural pressure. Yale's J/WNJ ratio (1.39×) is 12.6 times worse than Princeton's (0.11×). The model points in the wrong direction between these two schools. Both endpoints rest on independent survey instruments: the Yale Chaplain series and the Princeton CIRP/Hargadon and Daily Princetonian series. The Penn-Yale pair confirms the directional failure from the opposite angle: Penn carries a substantially higher composite score (0.494) than Yale (0.344), meaning the model registers Penn as facing greater structural pressure, yet Penn produces a Normal outcome (0.68×) while Yale produces an Anomalous one (1.39×). The school with more structural pressure produced a better outcome. Penn's Jewish

enrollment figures draw on Brandeis CMJS independent survey data. The Harvard-Brown pair is corroborating: a gap of 0.076 composite points separates these schools, yet their Jewish enrollment outcomes are opposite in direction, Harvard anomalous and Brown an outperformer. Brown’s acknowledged instrument uncertainty means this pairing is supporting rather than independent evidence. The Dartmouth-Princeton pair (0.002 composite gap, 3.44× J/WNJ gap) is a recognized artifact of Dartmouth’s near-zero

White non-Jewish decline and is excluded from substantive conclusions. Across the three substantive pairs, composite score fails to predict the direction or magnitude of the Jewish enrollment outcome.

**Table F.3. Falsification Comparisons: Composite Score vs. Jewish Enrollment Outcome**

COMPARISON	SCHOOL A	A COMPOSITE	A J/WNJ	B COMPOSITE	B J/WNJ	SCORE GAP → J/WNJ GAP
<b>Yale vs. Princeton</b>	Yale	0.344	1.39×	0.381	0.11×	-0.037 → 1.28× reversal
<b>Penn vs. Yale (secondary)</b>	Penn	0.494	0.68×	0.344	1.39×	+0.150 → 0.71× reversal
<b>Harvard vs. Brown (corroborating)</b>	Harvard	0.584	2.33×	0.508	N/C†N/C (inverted)†	+0.076 → undefined
<b>Harvard vs. Princeton (magnitude)</b>	Harvard	0.584	2.33×	0.381	0.11×	+0.203 → 21× outcome gap

† Brown J/WNJ: not calculable due to cross-instrument inconsistency; directional classification as OUTPERFORMER is robust across all available data points. The Yale-Princeton pair is the primary falsification because it is directional: the model registers Princeton as facing more structural pressure than Yale (0.381 vs. 0.344), but Yale’s J/WNJ outcome is 12.6 times worse. The model points in the wrong direction, not merely the wrong magnitude. Neither endpoint depends on Hillel data. The Penn-Yale pair confirms the finding from the reverse direction: Penn has substantially more composite pressure than Yale (0.494 vs. 0.344) yet produces a Normal outcome (0.68×) against Yale’s Anomalous (1.39×). Penn’s Jewish enrollment is grounded in Brandeis CMJS independent survey data, the same instrument class as Harvard’s preferred baseline. The Harvard-Brown pair corroborates the finding: a 0.076 composite gap separates these schools, two private, Northeastern Ivy League universities with comparable institutional profiles yet Harvard is anomalous and Brown is an outperformer. Brown’s instrument uncertainty means this pairing is treated as supporting rather than primary evidence. The Harvard-Princeton pair illustrates the magnitude failure: a 0.203 composite gap produces a 21× outcome gap (Harvard 2.33×, Princeton 0.11×), both endpoints on the highest-confidence instruments in the dataset. Stanford’s normal outcome under maximum composite pressure (rank #1, composite 0.682) is discussed in the body text above; it is not shown as a separate pair because no school offers a direct opposite-direction comparator at a similar composite distance.

## F.4 LIMITATIONS

### **Instrument choices and cross-school comparability.**

#### **Hillel-to-Hillel for cross-school comparability.**

The cross-school stacking analysis uses Hillel-to-Hillel enrollment figures for all schools to ensure a consistent instrument at both endpoints for comparability. This introduces a known limitation: Hillel estimates are inclusive (religious and cultural identification), not religion-only, and historically overstated Jewish enrollment by 30–65% at some institutions relative to random-sample surveys.

Hillel's pre-2018 baselines overstate enrollment ~40–60% vs. independent surveys; current Hillel uses a narrower method. Hillel-to-Hillel declines here therefore overestimate true enrollment change, and the stacking model is explaining inflated figures. Its failure is more conservative than it appears, not less.

#### **Small sample size (n = 9).**

Nine schools are sufficient to establish the distributional pattern — the clear spread from outperformer to anomalous — and to perform the pairwise falsification comparisons that are the core argument. They are not sufficient to support regression analysis with conventional confidence intervals, which is why the regression has been removed from this appendix. The argument does not depend on regression; it depends on the pattern. The pattern is observable from the table without a regression line.

#### **Financial aid denominator approximation.**

The financial aid dimension uses domestic-adjusted IPEDS SFA rates (raw IPEDS rate

divided by one minus the international share), removing international students who are typically ineligible for need-based aid. This is a necessary correction, but the domestic adjustment is approximate because IPEDS SFA cohort and IPEDS EF international first-time undergraduates do not perfectly align in definition. The approximation does not materially affect the composite scores: removing the aid dimension entirely does not change the ranking of the four schools at the center of the analysis.

#### **Omitted variables.**

The four-factor model does not capture every structural pressure; additional candidates were tested and excluded for lacking consistent cross-school data. Appendix F addresses three additional mechanisms: athletic recruitment, socioeconomic targeting, and the double bind. None improves predictive failure. The model's core limitation is not factor selection; it is that no combination of quantifiable structural factors, individually or jointly, produces a distributional pattern that resembles what the enrollment data show.

#### **Instrument-measurement year alignment.**

Jewish enrollment baselines span a range of years (2006–08 for Harvard Hillel; 1988–2003 for Princeton CIRP) depending on what instrument is available. This is documented in Table F.2.1 and does not affect the core finding because the stacking model is calibrated to a consistent institutional baseline window (Fall 2014), and the Jewish enrollment figures are used to classify outcome tiers rather than as dependent variables in the model.

**Dartmouth.**

**Dartmouth's 3.55× ratio is a mathematical artifact.** Dartmouth's White enrollment decline (-3.9 pp) is the smallest in the nine-school dataset, an extreme outlier in the D3 dimension. This produces a J/WNJ ratio of 3.55×, the highest in the dataset, which would classify Dartmouth as the most anomalous school. However, the ratio is a mathematical artifact: a small denominator amplifies any Jewish decline.

Dartmouth's underlying Jewish enrollment decline is -19% on Hillel-to-Hillel, which is lower than Harvard, Yale, Penn, or Columbia. Dartmouth is excluded from the core falsification analysis and its D3 score of 0.000 in Table F.2.2 reflects its position at the minimum end of the White decline dimension.

## F.5 CONCLUSION: STACKING AS DESCRIPTION, NOT EXPLANATION

The stacking composite score is a useful descriptive tool: it confirms that all nine schools face genuine structural pressures on Jewish enrollment and quantifies the relative magnitude of those pressures. Stanford, Columbia, and Harvard face the highest combined structural pressure. Cornell, Yale, and Princeton face the lowest.

But the composite score fails as an explanation. The key analytical relationship — does higher stacking pressure produce worse Jewish enrollment outcomes? — does not hold in the data. Every methodological refinement of the composite model weakens the stacking hypothesis, not strengthens it. The composite model's failure to predict the observed distribution is not a statistical artifact; it is the core finding.

The falsification rests on four independent

observations and one corroborating comparison. Yale and Princeton face comparable structural pressure by the composite measure, with Princeton registering as more exposed; Yale's J/WNJ outcome (1.39×) is 12.6 times worse than Princeton's (0.11×), and the model points in the wrong direction between them. Penn's composite score (0.494) is substantially higher than Yale's (0.344), yet Penn produces a Normal outcome (0.68×) while Yale produces an Anomalous one (1.39×): the school with more structural pressure produced a better outcome, a directional reversal from the opposite angle. Neither of these two pairs depends on Hillel data at either endpoint. Harvard sits 0.2 composite points above Princeton and produces a J/WNJ ratio 13 to 21 times worse, a magnitude discrepancy that exceeds any plausible proportionality. Stanford, the highest-scoring school on composite pressure (0.68), produces a normal outcome (J/WNJ 0.48×). Harvard and Brown are structurally comparable schools that produce mirror-image outcomes, with Brown's instrument uncertainty acknowledged and this comparison treated as corroborating rather than primary. No structural configuration of the four factors, individually or jointly, produces a pattern consistent with the observed distribution. The question this report asks is what does explain it, and the answer remains outstanding, pending systematic measurement by the institutions with access to the data that would resolve it.

## APPENDIX G

*References and Source Notes*

Note on sources: References include (i) primary sources – official data, institutional disclosures, statutes, court records – treated as controlling when available; (ii) secondary sources – major research institutions and journalism; and (iii) commentary. Sources marked (Commentary) inform context but are not treated as primary evidence. All Hillel International figures are subject to the calibration and tier-classification framework described in Appendix A.

## PRIMARY DATA SOURCES

Harvard University, Office of Institutional Research. Common Data Set, 2006–2025. Annual standardized filings (Section B2: Enrollment by Race/Ethnicity). <https://oir.harvard.edu/common-data-set>

Brown University, Office of Institutional Research. Common Data Set, 2006–2025.

Cornell University, Office of Institutional Research. Common Data Set, 2006–2025.

Yale University, Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania, Columbia University, Dartmouth College, Stanford University. Common Data Set filings, various years.

U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). Race/ethnicity enrollment data, 2006–2024; Student Financial Aid (SFA) Survey, AY 2003–04, 2013–14, 2023–24; Domestic Student State of Origin, AY 1992, 2004, 2014, 2024. <https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/>

College Board. SAT Suite of Assessments Annual Reports, 2007–2024. Group means, standard deviations, and test-taker counts by race/ethnicity.

Columbia University Office of Planning and Institutional Research (OPIR). School-level undergraduate enrollment by race/ethnicity, 2024. Used for CC/SEAS vs. General Studies decomposition (Appendix C.9).

Harvard College Admissions Office. Annual admissions statistics, 2003–2025.

Harvard University. Harvard College Fact Sheet and Financial Aid Fact Sheet, 2023–2024.

## JEWISH ENROLLMENT ESTIMATES

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